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ABSTRACT 
The problem that the project discusses is: state practice in the presence of a nuclear threat 
challenges self-defense requirement under Article 51 of UN Charter “ the occurrence of 
an armed attack”. In fact, states claim that the imminence of the nuclear threat and 
necessity of an armed attack regulate their practice in handling it. This is based on 
Caroline Case principles 1837. 
The project hypothesis is in the presence of a nuclear threat state practice changes into 
preemption consistent with Caroline principles. The hypothesis is elaborated in four case 
studies based on Theory-Guided methodology. The possibility of conducting a 
preemptive self-defense attack by China against North Korea, United States invasion of 
Iraq 2003, Israel Bombing Osirak 1981and Israel bombing Al Kibar 2007 are the case 
studies. The hypothesis states that the four case studies create a new norm of preemption 
based on Caroline case. 
The findings do not support the hypothesis. The project interprets that China abides by 
Article 51 of United Nations, NPT and IAEA regulation in the case of North Korea. 
Israel and United States practice diverge from International Law and Customary 
International law requirements of self-defense in the presence of a nuclear weapons 
threat. In other words, their practices are based on Begin and Bush Doctrines. There is no 
new norm of preemption consistent with Caroline case in the presence of a nuclear threat.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
I. Introduction 
 
“We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s 
adversaries…The greater the threat, the greater is the threat of inaction — and the more compelling the 
case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and 
place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States 
will, if necessary, act pre-emptively.” 
— George W Bush 
United States National Security Strategy, 2002 
 
Inspired by the enormous capability of a nuclear threat, this project examines the impact 
of this threat on state practice. The project studies four cases: the possibility of an attack 
by China against North Korea, US invasion of Iraq 2003, Israel bombing Osirak reactor 
in Iraq 1981 and Israel bombing Al-Kibar 2007. It questions whether or not the change in 
state practice in the cases creates a new norm of preemptive self-defense based on 
Caroline Doctrine. To be specific, the project query is: Does the change in state practice 
in the presence of a nuclear threat creates preemptive self-defense norm consistent with 
Caroline principles? The hypothesis indicates that the occurrence of a nuclear menace 
encourages the development of a new norm of preemption under Caroline case 1837 
requirements.   
Arend (2003) in his article International Law and the Preemptive Use of Military Force 
identifies the two criteria for preemptive self-defense under Caroline case:  necessity and 
proportionality of an attack (Arend, 2003). Both Caroline case and Article 51 of UN 
Charter principles are examined in each case to evaluate whether the change in state 
practice towards a nuclear threat was based on Caroline case or Article 51  
Nuclear weapons threats influence state practice. Firstly, Early and Asal (2014) in their 
empirical research, Nuclear Weapons and Existential Threats: Insights from a 
 6 
Comparative Analysis of Nuclear-Armed States argue that not all nuclear weapons have 
the same effect on states repercussions. Some nuclear weapons can reach neighboring 
countries and others can reach distant countries (Early and Asal, 2014). Secondly, Sagan 
(2002) op cit in Early and Asal (2014) argues that any mistake or error concerning the 
elimination of the threat can have the capacity to jeopardize the safety of the states
1
 
(Early and Asal, 2014).  
Given the hazardous consequences of nuclear weapons, the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT) regulates nuclear weapons and non-nuclear weapons states. The Nuclear Threat 
Initiative discusses NPT treaty. “ Nuclear Weapon states (NWS) are not to transfer to any 
recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and not to 
assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) to manufacture or 
otherwise acquire them” (NTI, n.d.). In addition, the NPT provides safeguards 
mechanism. “NNWS must place all nuclear materials in all peaceful nuclear activities 
under IAEA safeguards” (NTI, .n.d). The NPT encourages states to exchange nuclear 
weapons for peaceful purposes (NTI, n.d.). One of the main obligations under NPT is 
disarmament. In other words, “All parties must pursue negotiations in good faith on 
effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear 
disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and 
effective international control” (NTI, n.d.).   
Nonetheless, Ford (2007) critically evaluates Article VI under the NPT in his article 
Debating Disarmament: Interpreting Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons. Article VI is the main article that demands disarmament. It mentions 
                                                        
1 Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons quoted in Early and Asal (2014) Nuclear Weapons and Existential Threats: 
Insights from a Comparative Analysis of Nuclear-Armed States 
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that negotiations should be “in good faith” however disarmament steps are not mentioned 
(Ford, 2007). Besides, Weise (2012) in his thesis How Nuclear Weapons Change The 
Doctrine Of Self-Defense explains how nuclear weapons changed self-defense doctrine. 
He criticizes the Security Council in the United Nations and maintains that it lacks 
enforcement mechanisms due to the veto system and states interests (Weise, 2012).  
From a legal perspective, the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons under 
International Court of Justice advisory opinion is neutral. It did not determine whether or 
not the use of nuclear weapons is legal (icj-cij.org, 1996). Weise (2012) highlights the 
consequences of NPT failure: 
Continued failure to address shortfalls of current nonproliferation law and the 
international prohibition on the use of force hurts the international legal regime in 
two ways. First, international law is undermined by international leaders who 
believe that unilateral military action is necessary and morally justified, regardless 
of its legality…Second, the international legal regime is hurt by states that violate 
their non-proliferation and disarmament obligations under customary international 
law and the NPT (Weise, 2012).  
 
The limitations that are found in nonproliferation law and the international prohibition on 
the use of force, therefore, encourage states to act preemptively against a nuclear threat. 
The possibility of an attack by China against North Korea, US invasion in Iraq 2003, 
Israel bombing Osirak in 1981and Israel bombing Al-Kibar 2007 are mere examples. 
To examine if the resort to preemptive self-defense in the four cases created a new norm 
consistent with Caroline principles or not, the project elaborates the development of 
customary international law.  In fact, customary international law norms are created if 
they meet specific criteria. The International Committee of the Red Cross in its article, 
Customary IHL – Introduction stipulates the two main elements of customary 
international law:  
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It is generally agreed that the existence of a rule of customary international law 
requires the presence of two elements, namely State practice (usus) and a belief 
that such practice is required, prohibited or allowed, depending on the nature of 
the rule, as a matter of law (opinio juris sive necessitatis) (Icrc.org, n.d.).  
 
II. The Research Question 
The objective of this project is to analyze state practice in regards to preemptive self-
defense in the presence of a nuclear threat. In particular, does state practice in regards to 
countering an emerging threat of nuclear weapons suggests a change in customary 
international law that permits preemptive self-defense in presence of nuclear threat? 
Consequently, the project answers the following questions: 
1. What are the norms historically on preemptive self-defense? 
2. What defines the limits on state behavior in terms of self-defense when a nuclear 
weapons threat is present? 
3. What conventions are in place to mitigate? 
4. Do states trust these or is there evidence of states acting preemptively? 
5. What are the requirements for creating a new norm?  
 
The main hypothesis is that in the presence of nuclear threats, state practice diverges 
from international law as expressed in UN Charter.  The following three case studies: 
Israel bombing Osirak 1981, US invasion in Iraq 2003 and Israel bombing Al-Kibar 2007 
have two common factors: the occurrence of preemptive self-defense and the presence of 
a nuclear threat. In the fourth case, the possibility of an attack by China against North 
Korea has not been an attack yet but a nuclear threat exists.  
When measuring the gradual change of state practice in the case studies, the project 
concentrates on customary law (state practice and opinio juris) and self-defense legal 
requirements in Article 51 under the United Nations Charter. Also, the project focuses on 
the customary law requirements of pre-emptive self-defense stated in the Caroline Case: 
necessity and proportionality of the attack. Greenwood (2003) in his article International 
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Law and the Pre-emptive Use of Force: Afghanistan, Al-Qaida, and Iraq, maintains that 
the threat must be “A necessity of self-defense, overwhelming, leaving no choice of 
means and no moment for deliberation” (Greenwood, 2003).  Arend (2003) indicates that 
the attack should be proportional to the threat under Caroline criteria of preemptive self-
defense (Arend, 2003).  
III. Background 
Article 51of United Nations and International Law are Ambiguous In Regards to Nuclear 
Threats  
The text of Article 51 of UN Charter suggests that the right of self-defense is legal under 
the condition of the occurrence of an armed attack first. 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United 
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of 
this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council 
and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security 
Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems 
necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security (U.N. 
Charter art. 51).  
 
The interpretation of Article 51 is not clear. Should states wait until an armed attack takes 
place or act before the attack destroys them? Neither the International Court of Justice 
nor the Security Council decided on the precise meaning of the article. Furthermore, “ the 
Nicaragua case, the ICJ made a point of noting that, because the issue of the lawfulness 
of a response to the imminent threat of armed attack has not been raised … the Court 
expresses no view on the issue”2 (Arend, 2003).  
In addition, nuclear weapons threats are not addressed by traditional international law. 
Odomovo (2013) in his research New Security Threats, Unilateral Use of Force, and the 
                                                        
2
 opinion of the Court para. 194 quoted in Arned (2003): International Law and the Preemptive Use of Military Force. 
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International legal Order, examines the role of international legal system in handling 
new threats through the use of force (Odomovo, 2013). “International law, as embodied, 
in the UN Charter is concerned more with the maintenance of peace and security and less 
with the legal rules of the use of force” (Odomovo, 2013). Thus, state practice in 
handling new threats violates and changes international law (Odomovo, 2013). “Although 
these changes still lack the status of binding international law, as they are at the level of 
individual state practice, they have set a legal precedent to which other states would lay 
claim in the future” (Odomovo, 2013) However, it can be binding if the violations are 
accepted (Odomovo, 2013). 
Indeed, “the emergence of more elusive and deadly threats posed by the convergence of 
terrorism and WMD has rendered dangerous such restrictive standards of international 
law as “imminence” because the threat of nuclear attack is always imminent” (Odomovo, 
2013). Likewise, “Neither WMD nor terrorist actors were envisioned in this 
framework”(Arend, 2003).  Nuclear weapons in particular were secretly reserved; 
therefore, the UN Charter did not include them (Arend, 2003). “John Foster Dulles would 
later observe, the UN Charter was a “pre-atomic” document”3 (Arend, 2003). Nuclear 
weapons are exceptional threats. “It can be very difficult to determine whether a state 
possesses WMD, and by the time its use is imminent, it could be extremely difficult for a 
state to mount an effective defense” (Arend, 2003). As a result, states may attack the 
source of the threat before it becomes imminent (Arend, 2003). To conclude, “without 
meaningful reforms incorporating a more flexible and holistic view of states’ right of 
                                                        
3 John Foster Dulles, “The Challenge of Our Time: Peace with Justice,” American Bar Association Journal 38 (1953): 1066 quoted in 
Arend, A. (2003). International Law and the Preemptive Use of Military Force. 
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self-defense against terrorism and WMD, international law regulating the use of force 
will become irrelevant in the face of emerging security threats” (Odomovo, 2013). 
Customary International Law 
Scharf (2014) in his paper Accelerated Formation of Customary International Law, 
discusses customary international law.  Customary international law plays a critical role 
in international law. “First, in some ways, customary international law possesses more 
jurisprudential power than does treaty law” (Scharf, 2014).  Customary international law 
binds unlike treaties all states “so long as they did not persistently object during its 
formation” (Scharf, 2014). The rules of customary international law are extended “ to 
those States that have not yet ratified the treaty” (Scharf, 2014). In addition, independent 
states are bound by customary international law existing “ upon the date they become 
sovereign states” (Scharf, 2014). Unilateral withdrawal is not recognized under 
customary international law (Scharf, 2014). Secondly, the creation of customary 
international law does not take much time in comparison to treaties (Scharf, 2014). 
“Customary international law often forms at a much faster pace, especially with respect 
to areas of technological or other fundamental change” (Scharf, 2014). Finally, some 
believe that treaties provide “detailed articulations in legal obligations but this is not 
always the case. Rather, the provisions of treaties, especially multinational conventions, 
are also often subject to what H.L.A. Hart called a penumbra of uncertainty”4 (Scharf, 
2014).   
In fact, Ferreira et al. (2013) in their article Formation and Evidence of Customary 
International Law, elaborate the elements of customary international law. “The 
                                                        
4 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF Law 121–32, 144–50 (1961) quoted in Scharf (2014):“Accelerated Formation of Customary 
International Law” 
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combination is traditionally referred to as two element theory”(Ferreira et al., 2013). The 
two elements are state practice and opinio juris (Ferreira et al., 2013). “In analyzing state 
practice, the following issues must be taken into consideration: whose practice is 
relevant, which forms may practice take, how uniform must it be, for how long must it be 
observed and what is the role of specially affected states” (Ferreira et al., 2013). 
Moreover, opinio juris is determined either through evidence of state practice or more 
positive evidence of the belief that a given practice is legally obligatory 
5
(Ferreira et al., 
2013).  In each case study, international community response will be determined in order 
to notice whether or not there is an evidence of opinio juris. 
The project consists of five chapters. Chapter one describes the topic. It includes the 
research question, background, client description and preview of findings. Chapter two 
demonstrates the literature review that presents a comprehensive survey on the literature 
used in the project; it underlines crucial works, major school of thought and gaps. 
Chapter three discuss the methodology that is applied in the project and the data collected 
to answer the project question. Chapter four analyses and interprets the four case studies; 
The Possibility of an attack initiated by China against North Korea, US invasion of Iraq 
2003, Israel bombing Osirak 1981and Israel bombing Al-Kibar 2007. Finally, Chapter 
five concludes the project and gives recommendations for further studies.  
IV. Client Description  
The project targets officials and states in the United Nations, Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT) and International Atomic Energy Agency. Also, it targets states that use nuclear 
threats to justify preemptive self-defense attacks and states that proliferate nuclear 
                                                        
5 Brownlie (2008), 8-9 quoted in Ferreira et al. (2013) in their article “Formation and Evidence of Customary   
  International Law 
 13 
weapons. From the four case studies that are analyzed in the project, the governments of 
Israel, United States and China are selected. The UN Charter and customary international 
law are the bases of the argument. The findings in the project identify state practice in the 
presence of nuclear threats. Another outcome of the project is highlighting the illegality 
of preemptive self-defense and use of force through the change of state practice in four 
different cases in different times with the presence of nuclear threat.   
This project positively adds to security studies, explains United Nations General 
Assembly Resolutions and International Atomic Energy Agency role in the presence of a 
nuclear threat. It illustrates United Nations Security Council Resolutions, adds to world 
legal institutions and maintains the role of regional and international organizations.  
The project is significant because it improves our understanding of state practice in 
regards to preemptive self-defense and its relation to nuclear threats. It is important to 
know more about preemptive self-defense in International Law.  
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 CHAPTER TWO 
Literature Review 
The concern must be indicated by the failure of researches to examine the need for a new 
norm that combats nuclear weapons threats consistent with preemption under Caroline 
case. Little research reached down to the change in state practice due to the effects of 
nuclear threats. 
Pre-emptive Self-Defense Under Article 51 of United Nations: 
 Pre-emptive self-defense is a limited act under Article 51 of United Nations Charter. 
Mulcahy and Mahony (2006) in their article discuss the basic articles that govern the use 
of force under the UN Charter: Articles 2(4) and 51(Mulcahy and Mahony, 2006). “The 
resort to armed force is prohibited under international law, except where the UN Security 
Council gives permission or where Article 51 permits the use of force if used as a means 
of self-defense” (Mulcahy and Mahony, 2006). Following this, “ an armed attack must 
have occurred before a state can lawfully act in self-defense” (Mulcahy and Mahony, 
2006). Indeed, There are two different explanations among scholars regarding Article 51. 
The main debate surrounds the interpretation of “if an armed attack occurs”.  
Some scholars affirm that Article 51 of United Nations allows self-defense attacks if an 
armed attack occurred only (Mulcahy and Mahony, 2006): 
The strengths of the restrictionist legal argument emanates from the wording of 
Article 51 which explicitly affirms nothing in the present charter shall impair the 
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs 
against a member state of the UN (Mulcahy and Mahony, 2006).  
 
Although there are two perspectives on Article 51, the restricted view is applied in the 
four case studies of the research. It examines the change in state’s practice into pre-
emptive self-defense according to the UN Charter. 
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The Type of The Threat: Nuclear Weapons 
 
This section discusses the nature of nuclear weapons and why might nuclear weapons 
change state practice into preemptive self-defense consistent with Caroline Doctrine 
principles. 
Nuclear Weapons Threats are different: 
Some scholars argue that nuclear weapons threats are different due to certain factors. 
Firstly, Early and Asal (2014) believe that “Some countries possess nuclear weapons 
arsenals capable of wiping out the planet while others possess small arsenals capable of 
damaging only a limited number of targets” (Early and Asal, 2014). Nuclear weapons can 
challenge the existence and the survival of states. “Nuclear weapons are fundamentally 
different from other security threats because they have the potential ability to quickly and 
completely annihilate their targets’ militaries, populations, and infrastructure” (Early and 
Asal, 2014). Technically, nuclear weapons have mass destruction effect in infrastructure, 
physical objects, human beings and other areas. “Nuclear explosions can be many 
thousands (or millions) of times more powerful than the largest conventional 
detonations…the temperatures reached in a nuclear explosion are very much higher than 
in a conventional explosion” (Atomic archive, n.d.). Consequently, states believe that it is 
necessary to handle the threat preemptively, in other words, before launching nuclear 
weapons. 
Secondly, nuclear weapons are decisive threats and any mistake or error concerning their 
elimination can imperil state safeness. Sagan (2002) (op cit in Early and Asal, 2014) 
claims that history witnessed many incidents where nuclear threats could have destroyed 
humanity. An example according to Sagan was an event between the USSR and USA that 
took place during the cold war:  
 16 
Stanislav Petrov, a commander of a Soviet early-warning bunker, was told by his 
computer that the United States had launched a nuclear assault. Given that the 
response time was less than 20 minutes, it would have made perfect sense for 
Petrov to have immediately issued an alert that would have very likely led to a 
hail of nuclear missiles being directed at the United States. Luckily, Petrov 
gambled on the unlikely nature of a nuclear strike from the United States that 
would involve fewer than five missiles and decided not to issue an alert—a risky 
gamble in his position, to say the least. Nonetheless, he decided not to issue an 
alert (Early and Asal, 2014).  
 
Given the nature of the nuclear threat, the Soviet Union could have initiated an 
anticipatory self-defense based on Caroline principle: necessity of the attack.  
Furthermore, the type of governments arguably can threaten the security of states when 
facing nuclear weapons threats. Sagan (2002) (op cit in Early and Asal, 2014) adds to 
previous arguments. “ These risks are apt to be much higher, though, in states suffering 
from endemic corruption or experiencing drastic leadership changes, mutinies by their 
armed forces, or regime collapses” (Early and Asal, 2014). Specifically, when the 
governments are unstable and corrupted, the control of the nuclear arsenals will be 
unstable compared to other governments. For instance, United States in 2003 considered 
Saddam as a dictator who was supporting terrorism and acquiring WMD. 
Finally, some scholars believe that acquiring nuclear weapons enhances the ability to 
control events and decisions. Schelling (op cit in Early and Asal, 2014), states “Nuclear 
weapons can change the speed of events, the control of events, the sequence of events, 
the relation of victor to vanquished, and the relation of homeland to fighting front”(Early 
and Asal, 2014). ). In the article The Bargaining Chip and SALT, Bresler and Gray (1977) 
claims that one way of controlling events is to use nuclear weapons as a bargaining chip. 
Nuclear weapons threat can be justified as a diplomatic advantage in negotiation (Bresler 
and Gray, 1977). To sum up, the nature of nuclear threats is imminent, overwhelming, 
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leaving no moment of deliberation and no other choice in the sense that it manipulates 
events and decisions therefore, states tend to initiate preemptive strikes based on Caroline 
Doctrine to combat it. States establish a series of actions that might be acceptable in the 
face of such a threat; For instance, Israel bombing Al-Kibar in 2007.  
The Role of Non-Proliferation Treaty, United Nations Security Council and Legal System 
in Handling Nuclear Weapons: 
Given how dangerous these weapons are, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and United 
Nations regulate the usage of nuclear weapons. On one hand, the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty according to Aboul-Enein (2010) is the main treaty that encourages nuclear 
disarmament. “… NPT remains the only international instrument that not only seeks to 
prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons but that also embodies a firm legal 
commitment to eliminate these weapons” (Aboul-Enein, 2010). However, in the three 
case studies Israel and United States disregarded the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
requirements and they used preemptive self-defense to handle the nuclear threat due to 
nuclear weapons different nature. 
Asadov in her thesis The Efficacy of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime stipulates 
that: 
The state possessing nuclear weapons is that which has manufactured and 
exploded a weapon or device before January 1, 1967 (USSR, USA, UK, France, 
and China). It orders to the nuclear powers not to transfer to anyone nuclear 
weapons and control over them, not to help the non-nuclear weapon states in 
production or acquisition of such weapons (Asadov, 2012). 
 
The Non-Proliferation Treaty bans any transfer of nuclear weapons: 
Devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; 
and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State 
to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 
devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices (NPT, 1970).  
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The NPT consists of six sections. It is divided between not to transform nuclear weapons 
to non-nuclear states and the "inalienable right" for peaceful usage of nuclear weapons: 
The first three articles forbid the participants to transmit nuclear weapons to non- 
nuclear weapon states, create nuclear weapons except the case when it has been 
already done, and distribute nuclear materials without international safety 
measure. The following three articles launch the "inalienable right" of all parties 
to progress in nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. In addition, it provides that 
all parties must enable, and have right to take part in the potential interchange of 
“equipment, Lastly, the NPT directs all parties to "pursue negotiations in good 
faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an 
early date and to nuclear disarmament"; that is, the nuclear weapon states had to 
terminate their "vertical proliferation in exchange for an end to horizontal 
proliferation” (Asadov, 2012). 
 
Moreover, Article III in the NPT provides an inspection mechanism that supervises the 
adherence of member states to the treaty. In other words: 
The functioning of the NPT is monitored by the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA). It was founded in the late 1950s in Vienna to assist developing 
countries in acquiring access to nuclear energy and ensuring its safe use. After 
entry into force of the NPT, the IAEA has signed agreement with the non-nuclear 
states, after which the Agency’s international inspectors got the right to visit and 
inspect the facilities of the states declared as a nuclear developing state. (Asadov, 
2012). 
 
Arms Control Association (2012) adds in The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) at 
a Glance article, “Article III tasks the International Atomic Energy Agency with the 
inspection of the non-nuclear- weapon states' nuclear facilities. In addition, Article III 
establishes safeguards for the transfer of fissionable materials between NWS and 
NNWS” (Arms Control Association, 2012). This article is breached in the case studies 
especially in Iraq case 2003. Although in Iraq 2003 some states request United States to 
wait for more inspections, the United States reacted preemptively.  
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Limitations of Non-Proliferation Treaty, United Nations Security Council and Legal 
System in Handling Nuclear Weapons:  
The International Court of Justice did not decide on the legality of the threat or use of 
nuclear weapons. Bello and Bekker (1997) in their article International Decision: 
Legality Of The Use By A State Of Nuclear Weapons In Armed Conflict, Advisory 
Opinion quoted the International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion regarding the legality 
of the threat and the use of nuclear weapons. They state that the court had not accepted 
nor refused the threat or the use of nuclear weapons (Bello and Bekker, 1997). The final 
decision was “there is no law within international or customary that authorizes using or 
threating to use nuclear weapons” (Bello and Bekker, 1997). This is considered one 
weakness of the international law in handling nuclear weapons threats. In the project, this 
point is used as a justification for the change in state practice in the presence of nuclear 
weapons. 
Moreover, the NPT according to Ford (2007) is “…often alleged or insinuated that the 
United States is in violation of its obligations under NPT Article VI to undertake nuclear 
disarmament”(Ford, 2007). Another main weakness to the NPT is Article VI:  
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith 
on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early 
date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete 
disarmament under strict and effective international control (NPT, 2005). 
 
However, the language of the article is misleading and gives vague meaning, for example 
“negotiate in a good faith” and  “ cessation of the nuclear early date” (Ford, 2007).  
Secondly, in dissenting opinion of Judge Koroma on the Advisory Opinion regarding the 
legality of the threat and the use of nuclear weapons, he argued against the court findings: 
Such a finding, he maintained, could not be sustained on the basis of existing 
international law, or in the face of the weight and abundance of evidence and 
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material presented to the Court. In his view, on the basis of the existing law 
particularly humanitarian law and the material available the Court, the use of 
nuclear weapons in any circumstance would at the very least result in the 
violation of the principles and rules of that law and is, therefore, unlawful 
(Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, 1996).  
 
Judge Higins in her dissenting opinion on the Advisory Opinion regarding the legality of 
the threat questioned the ICJ findings:  
…The Court had not applied the rules of humanitarian law in a systematic and 
transparent way to show how it reached the conclusion in the first part of 
paragraph 2 E of the dispositive: Nor was the meaning of the first part of 
paragraph 2 E clear  (Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, 1996).  
 
Finally, Security Council does not have the mechanisms of enforcement. Weise (2012) in 
his article critiques the Security Council “The lack of action by the Security Council is 
likely due to its structure, where any permanent member can veto a Security Council 
resolution. One permanent member can prevent any substantive resolution from passing, 
even if a majority of permanent and non-permanent members support the resolution” 
(Weise, 2012). Even when states vote on decisions banning the usage of nuclear 
weapons, the five member states (leading nuclear powers) veto the decisions due to their 
economic and political interests. For instance: 
Prior to the Gulf War, France and Russia opposed Security Council resolutions 
calling Iraq into compliance with previous Security Council resolutions because 
such action would hurt France’s and Russia’s economic interests in the region. In 
another example, China has until recently refused to implement the tough 
sanctions necessary to bring Iran to the bargaining table because China’s missile 
technology trade with Iran is lucrative (Weise, 2012).  
 
These are examples of the ineffectiveness of Security Council in handling nuclear   
weapons threat.  Indeed, the nature of the threat and the limitations within the NPT and 
Security Council encourage states to initiate preemptive strikes in the presence of nuclear 
threats. The four case studies are mere examples. 
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Pre-emptive Self-Defense Under Caroline Case: 
Indeed, Caroline case has been contested in the literature. Crawford, Pellet, Olleson & 
Parlett in their book The Law of International Responsibility present different point of 
views on preemptive self-defense under Caroline case. Firstly, some scholars as Ago in 
his Eight Report on state responsibility refused Caroline case  “ Self-defense can not exist 
at all in a legal system which does not prohibit the recourse of force” (Crawford, Pellet, 
Olleson & Parlett, 2010). Secondly, some scholars uphold that the “ Caroline incident is 
not a case of self-defense, it is a case of necessity” (Crawford, Pellet, Olleson & Parlett, 
2010). Preemptive self-defense is a limited act under customary international law. Indeed, 
Caroline case is part of customary international law and the origin of pre-emptive self-
defense doctrine. It states the requirements of pre-emptive self-defense: necessity and 
proportionality of the attack. According to Greenwood (2003) pre-emptive self-defense 
under customary international law allows an attack when it is necessary. In other words, 
“a necessity of self-defense, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment 
for deliberation” (Greenwood, 2003).  
Necessity: 
The prominent principle of Caroline case is the necessity to strike against the threat. 
Tsaguourios (2011) in his article quoted Daniel Webster opinion in the Caroline case as: 
‘the act justified by the necessity … must be limited by that necessity and kept clearly 
within it” (Tsagourias, 2011). Furthermore, Remler (n.d.) in his article The Right of 
Anticipatory Self – Defense and the Use of Force argues that “Necessity further means 
that the state threatened must not, in the particular circumstances, have had any means of 
halting the attack other than recourse to armed force” (Remler, n.d.).  
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However, the relationship between necessity and imminence factors is not clear. “The 
threat of an attack must be demonstrably imminent and the use of force to respond must 
be necessary” (Remler, n.d.). Akande and Lieflander (2013) add the challenge of 
conceptualizing “imminence” to Remler’s (n.d.) argument. “…Imminence describes a 
certain pressuring quality that a threat must have for anticipatory self-defense to be 
lawful” ”(Akande and Lieflander, 2013). Bethlehem in (Akande and Lieflander, 2013) 
notes that new threats demand to redevelop the concept of imminence”(Akande and 
Lieflander, 2013).  
In order to analyze a threat, Bethlehem in (Akande and Lieflander, 2013) highlights four 
main components. “(1) type—what kind of attack is threatened? (2) likelihood—how 
probable is it that the attack will occur? (3) gravity—how severe will the attack be? and 
(4) timing—when will the attack occur?” (Akande and Lieflander, 2013). In fact, 
necessity of the attack is a central point to discuss states perception of the nuclear threat 
in the three case studies and to discuss the necessity of the attack in the aftermath.  
Proportionality:  
The second principle of a legal pre-emptive self-defense attack under Caroline case is 
proportionality. There are three trends regarding proportionality (Akande and Lieflander, 
2013). Some scholars figure that “ it may simply be used to describe the requirement that 
the defending state use no more force than is necessary” (Akande and Lieflander, 2013). 
Likewise, Fitzgerald (2008) defines proportionality as “nothing unreasonable or 
excessive may be done because the act must be distinctly limited by the necessity causing 
it”(Fitzgerald, 2008). Proportionality completes necessity as an element for preemptive 
self-defense under Caroline Doctrine. Another group of scholars believe that 
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quantitatively the attack must be equal to the threat (Akande and Lieflander, 2013). The 
last group of scholars demonstrates that “proportionality may require that the damage 
inflicted in self-defense not be disproportionate in comparison to the pursued objective” 
(Akande and Lieflander, 2013). In the project, the first trend of proportionality that 
allows a pre-emptive self-defense attack targeting the threat only is used in the project 
because it can be measurable in the cases. Indeed, nuclear weapons have this imminence 
and urgency that makes preemptive action warranted provided that action is proportional 
and confined to targeting the threat. This means that Israel bombing Osirak was 
proportional to the nuclear threat in Iraq 1981 because it attacked the nuclear reactor. 
However, the US invasion was not proportional to the threat in 2003. 
Pre-emptive Self-Defense Norms 
 
For the purpose of the project, this part concentrates on the relation ship between 
Caroline Doctrine and Article 51 of UN Charter. Greenwood (2003) in his discussion of 
self-defense notes that United Nations Charter did not create self-defense right. “ …it is a 
customary law right… and is said to be inherent in the concept of Statehood… but the 
conditions for its exercise are mostly to be found in the provisions of Article 51” 
(Greenwood, 2003). In other words, Article 51 “preserved the inherent right” and did not 
create it (Greenwood, 2003). In fact, there is a close relationship between customary 
international law of the right of self-defense and provisions of Article 51 “this has been 
confirmed by the International Court and are not a matter of controversy
6” (Greenwood, 
2003). In order to consider lawful use of force, “the use of force must not exceed what is 
necessary and proportionate in self-defense” (Greenwood, 2003). The United States and 
                                                        
6 Military and Paramilitary (Nicar.v.U.S.), supra note 6, at 104-06 cited in Greenwood (2003) “International Law and the Pre-emptive 
Use of Force: Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda, and Iraq. 
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United kingdom according to Greenwood (2003) always maintain that self-defense right 
is also applies when the threat is imminent even if an armed attack did not take place yet 
(Greenwood, 2003). This can be traced back to Caroline Doctrine (Greenwood, 2003). 
Since 1945, the right of self-defense preserved the right to use force in the presence of 
“imminent armed attack” (Greenwood, 2003). Therefore, Caroline principles coexist 
beside the Article 51 of UN Charter. 
The Creation of New Norms Under Customary International Law: 
Scharf (2014) in his article states that “The text of Article 38 reflects the view that 
customary international law is composed of two elements: 1) general State practice, 
termed the objective element; and 2) some sort of attitude towards practice (be it 
acknowledgment as law or consent), termed the subjective element”(Scharf, 2014). In the 
project, both elements of customary international law are applied to question the creation  
of new norm consistent with pre-emptive self-defense consistent with Caroline principles. 
“The judgments of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) (the forerunner of 
the ICJ) and the ICJ have been consistent in stating that a customary rule requires the 
presence of both of these elements” (Scharf, 2014). Similarly, in 1969 North Sea 
Continental Shelf, the ICJ ruled that the two elements of customary international law bind 
states however, “with the exception of persistent objectors, without it being necessary to 
show that the particular State allegedly bound by the rule has participated in its formation 
or has otherwise accepted it” (Scharf, 2014). 
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State Practice (The Objective Element): 
Who’s Practice Counts?  
This part focuses on different forms that reflect state practice. In an article by Ferreira, 
Carvalho, Machry and Rigon (2013), they discuss the formation and evidence of 
customary international law. There are two scholar views. Scholars in the 20
th
 century 
believed that only “ those entitled to express the state’s consent to be bound” (Ferreira et 
al., 2013). Other scholars consider state’s domestic courts and international tribunals are 
considered act of state’s practice. Scharf (2014) in his article adds to (Ferreira et al., 
2013) analysis that there are many forms that reflect state practice: 
 State practice can be reflected in the acts of the judiciary, legislature, or executive 
branch of government. It comes in many forms, including: Diplomatic 
correspondence; declarations of government policy; the advice of government 
legal advisers; press statements, military manuals, votes and explanation of votes 
in international organizations; the comments of governments on draft texts 
produced by the ILC; national legislation, domestic court decisions; and pleadings 
before international tribunals (Scharf, 2014). 
 
State statements are one of the core sources that indicate state practice. ICJ Judge Richard 
Baxter mentions that: 
 The firm statement by the State of what it considers to be the rule is far better 
evidence of its position than what can be pieced together from the actions of that 
country at different times and in a variety of contexts (Scharf, 2014). 
 
Besides, state’s actions or its absence are another critical source that display state’s 
practices. “We look to words as well as deeds, and to silences as well as inactions” (Scharf, 
2014). To sum up, states statements and actions analysis state’s practices in the research.  
State’s Practices Generate New Norm: 
Based on the objective element in customary international law, some scholars believe that 
state’s claim and response create new norm.  Myers McDougal School notes that new 
norms under customary international law are generated through state’s claim and 
response by other states (Scharf, 2014). “Some states may imitate the practice and others 
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may passively acquiesce in it” (Scharf, 2014). However, the state that initiated the claim 
has no guarantee that its actions will formulate a new binding custom; there are cases 
where states repudiate the claim (Scharf, 2014): 
The repudiation could constitute a reaffirmation of existing law, which is 
strengthened by the protest. Or, the claim and repudiation could constitute a 
stalemate, which could decelerate the formation of new customary international 
law. The reaction of Third States is also relevant. Out of this process of claim and 
response, and third party acquiescence or repudiation, rules emerge or are 
superseded (Scharf, 2014). 
 
Other scholars believe that state’s articulations create new norm. Professor D’Amato, (op. 
cite in Scharf, 2014) redefines the principles that develop new norms. In his own words, “ 
the articulation can either accompany the initial act (what McDougal called the “claim”), 
or it can be embodied in a treaty, draft instruments of the ILC, or resolutions of the U.N. 
General Assembly. Acts that follow and are consistent with the articulation will 
crystallize the policy into a principle that takes on life as a rule of customary international 
law” (Scharf, 2014). In fact, “McDougal’s claim and response concept is backward 
looking” and “ D’Amato’s conception is more like treaty law, proscribing rules for the 
future” (Scharf, 2014).  
Yet, of the two approaches, “many scholars believe McDougal’s claim and response 
concept better reflects the authentic world of politics, rather than some ideal world which 
may owe more to rhetoric than to reality” (Scharf, 2014). Subsequently, in the project 
claim and response concept are used to identify state practice that create new norms. 
Secondly, Michael Barton Akehurst notes  “a small amount of practice is sufficient to 
prove the existence of such rule, resting the burden of disproving its existence on the 
objecting party”(Scharf, 2014). Consistent with this, “scholars who have carefully 
dissected the judgments of the ICJ have concluded that most customs are found to exist 
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on the basis of practice by fewer than a dozen States” (Scharf, 2014). This been said, the 
project focuses mainly on states in the four case studies because their interests are 
endangered and because the project questions the change in their state practice. 
Thirdly, customary international law provides voluntary acceptance of new norms. “A 
State which manifests its opposition to a practice before it has developed into a rule of 
customary international law can, by virtue of that objection, opt out from the operation of 
the new rule” (Scharf, 2014). However, there are certain limitations: States should make 
objections before the emergence of the general rule, “customary international law rules 
are binding on new States and existing States that are newcomers to a particular type of 
activity” and “the rule does not apply to peremptory norms (jus cogens)” (Scharf, 2014). 
Regarding state practice, there are 3 conditions that are maintained by ICJ cases: 
(i) Generality 
 
There needs to be sufficient practice on the part of a sufficient number of states. But 
North Sea Continental Shelf at paragraph 73 specifies States whose interests are specially 
affected. 
Even without the passage of any considerable period of time, a very widespread 
and representative participation in the convention might suffice of itself, provided 
it included that of States whose interests were specially affected (North Sea 
Continental Shelf at paragraph 73) 
 
(ii) Consistency and Uniformity 
 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v USA) (1986)  
 
ICJ Rep 14, at paragraph 186 states:  
[It is] sufficient that the practice of States should in general be consistent with such 
rules and instances of State conduct inconsistent with the rule should have been 
treated as breaches of that rule and not as indications of the recognition of a new 
rule (Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua v USA, 
paragraph 186, 1986) 
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Duration of State’s Practice: 
Customary international law usually takes some time to develop.  However, a shorter 
period could be sufficient but the conditions in this case are even more difficult to meet. 
North Sea Continental Shelf stipulates at paragraph 73 and 74:  
As regards the time element, the Court notes that it is over ten years since the 
Convention was signed, but that it is even now less than five since it came into 
force in June 1964, and that when the present proceedings were brought it was less 
than three years, while less than one had elapsed at the time when the respective 
negotiations between the Federal Republic and the other two Parties for a complete 
delimitation broke down on the question of the application of the equidistance 
principle. Although the passage of only a short period of time is not necessarily, or 
of itself, a bar to the formation of a new rule of customary international law on the 
basis of what bras originally a purely conventional rule, an indispensable 
requirement would be that within the period in question, short though it might be, 
State practice, including that of States whose interests are specially affected, should 
have been both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the provision 
invoked; and should moreover have occurred in such a way as to show a general 
recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation is involved (North Sea Continental 
Shelf stipulates at paragraph 73 and 74) 
 
Opinio Juris (The Subjective Element): 
Asylum Case (Colombia/Peru), ICJ Rep 1950, p. 266 at p. 276-77 maintains: 
 
The Party which relies on a custom of this kind must prove that this custom is 
established in such a manner that it has become binding on the other Party. The 
Colombian Government must prove that the rule invoked by it is in accordance 
with a constant and uniform usage practised by the States in question, and that this 
usage is the expression of a right appertaining to the State granting asylum and a 
duty incumbent on the territorial State. This follows from Article 38 of the Statute 
of the Court, which refers to international custom "as evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law" (Asylum Case, paragraph 266, 1950) 
 
MoreNorth Sea Continental Shelf (1969) ICJ Rep 3, at paragraph 77: 
Two conditions must be fulfilled. Not only must the acts concerned amount to a 
settled practice, but they must also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be 
evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a 
rule of law requiring it.... The States concerned must therefore feel that they are 
conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation. The frequency, or even habitual 
character of the acts is not in itself enough. There are many international acts, e.g., 
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in the field of ceremonial and protocol, which are performed almost invariably, but 
which are motivated only by considerations of courtesy, convenience or tradition, 
and not by any sense of legal duty. 
 
Scholars traditionally emphasized the role of the objective element in the creation of 
customary norms. It was not an easy task to ascertain state’s belief rather than its practice 
(Scharf, 2014). However, “with the introduction of the U.N. and other bodies where 
multilateral diplomacy is conducted in the open, the situation has in fact reversed” 
(Scharf, 2014). In fact, there are two scholar views on Opinio Juris. On one hand:  
The voluntarist thesis maintains that, since States are sovereign, they cannot be 
bound by legal obligations (whether through treaty or customary law) without their 
consent. Consistent with this, voluntarists view the subjective element of 
customary international law as a manifestation of consent (Scharf, 2014).  
 
On the other hand, “belief” thesis maintains that custom’s binding force is based in the 
States’ belief in the legal necessity or permissibility of the practice in question” (Scharf, 
2014).  
 The project is consistent with the voluntaris thesis. Mendelson suggests that “in the early 
formation stage “acceptance” means consent to an emerging rule, and in the later stage 
“acceptance” means acknowledgment that the rule has gained the force of law” (Scharf, 
2014).  
Evidence of Opinio Juris: 
There are different sources to assist in deducing state’s consent: Treaties and Role of 
Judicial Decisions: 
A particular treaty might well contain some provisions meant to reflect existing 
customary law, and others, which constitute progressive development. Sometimes 
a treaty will expressly declare that its provisions, or certain of them, are 
declaratory of existing customary law (Scharf, 2014). 
 
Moreover, “judicial decisions can also have a formative effect on custom by crystallizing 
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emerging rules and thus influencing state behavior”(Scharf, 2014). In fact, “General 
Assembly Resolutions and judgments of international tribunals often play a heightened 
role in “crystallizing” the newly emergent rule” (Scharf, 2014). Consequently, the project 
will evaluate the response of United Nations and NPT after each attack in the three case 
studies. In the case studies,  
In the four case studies, how the state perceived the threat is discussed first. Then, the 
project discusses if the state worked through the Security Council and the NPT or 
preemptively attack other state based on Caroline requirements. Also, the project 
questions if there is consistent practice and consent over time may be new norm is 
created. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
V. Methodology 
The project tackles the research question by looking for evidence of state practice and 
opinion juris with regards to preemptive self-defense and nuclear weapons threats. The 
project’s theory is that state practice has evolved from upholding the Charter’s 
prohibition on preemption and reliance on conventions like NPT towards a policy of 
preemption that is more consistent with the Caroline principles. It traces this hypothesis 
through four case studies: the possibility of an attack by China against North Korea, US 
invasion of Iraq in 2003, Israel Bombing Osirak 1981 and Israel bombing Al-Kibar 2007. 
Evidences of opinion juris and state practice are: official discourse and UN resolutions. 
The project targets state practice and opinion juris therefore Theory-guided process 
tracing is suitable for it. Firstly, Theory-guided process integrates historical events with 
social sciences theories (Falleti, n.d). Secondly, This process correlates theories with 
outcomes. According to George and McKeown “…this method does not solely rely on 
the comparison of variations across variables in each case, but also investigate[s] and 
explain[s] the decision process by which various initial conditions are translated into 
outcomes” 7  (Falleti, n.d). Moreover, in a paper that was presented at the American 
Political Science Association annual meeting What is process tracing actually tracing? 
The three variants of process tracing methods and their uses and limitations, Beach and 
Pedersen (2011) note that there are three types of process tracing (PT). The Theory 
Testing Process Tracing as identified by Beach and Pedersen (2011) tackles the project’s 
                                                        
7 George, Alexander L. and Timothy J. McKeown. 1985. "Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making." Advances 
in Information Processing in Organizations 2: 21-58 quoted in Falleti (n.d.) “Theory-Guided Process-Tracing in Comparative Politics: 
Something Old, Something New” 
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question. However, the common factor to the three types is the casual mechanism. 
“Causal mechanisms can be defined as, …a complex system, which produces an outcome 
by the interaction of a number of parts  (Glennan, 1996:52)
8.” (Beach and Pedersen, 
2011).  
This methodology demonstrates X and Y through “…existing conjectures about a 
plausible mechanism or  …  deducing one from existing theorization relatively easily” 
(Beach and Pedersen, 2011). The main steps in the theory testing process are 
conceptualization and operationalization of the elements that cause Y. Conceptualization 
is to define the elements of the case study and the theory. Operationalization is to assure 
that all or some of the theory elements are present in the case (Beach and Pedersen, 
2011). Then, Beach and Pedersen (2011) adds: 
Once the mechanism is conceptualized and operationalized, the analyst proceeds 
to step 3, where she collects empirical evidence that can be used to make causal 
inferences, updating our confidence in 1) whether the hypothesized mechanism 
was actually present in the case, and 2) whether the mechanism functioned as 
predicted, or whether there were only some parts of the mechanism that were 
present (Beach and Pedersen, 2011). 
 
The project targets the two main criteria that create new norms: state practice and Opinio 
juris. In other words, the replication of the same act by states in the presence of a nuclear 
threat consistently and maintaining state’s consent.  
States statements and actions demonstrate the change in state practice that is the first 
element in creating a norm. Kammerholf (2004) questions in his article Uncertainty in the 
Formal Sources of International Law: Customary International Law and Some of Its 
Problems the uncertainty of customary international law. Kammerholf (2004) gives 
                                                        
8 Glennan, Stuart S. 1996. Mechanisms and the Nature of Causation. Erkenntnis 44(1): 49-71 quoted in Beach and Pedersen (2011) 
“What is process tracing actually tracing? The three variants of process tracing methods and their uses and limitations” 
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different interpretations of state practice and opinion juris. One view states that state’s 
actions help in determining the change in its practices. Anthony D’Amato and Michael 
Akehurst as (op. cit in Kammerholf, 2004) claim“ … What is crucial for him is not the 
making of a claim, but ‘enforcement action’ — ‘what the state will actually do’. This 
category also includes decisions not to act in situations where the state could have acted, 
as well as commitments to act”9 (Kammerholf, 2004). Another view mentions that state’s 
statements are a form of its practices.  Michael Akehurst argues, in contrast to Anthony 
D’ Amato, that state’s actions may overlap “with those other states during different times 
and governments”10 (Kammerholf, 2004).  Therefore, it is important to depend on both 
statements and actions when discussing state practice.  
In addition to state practice, Opinio juris constitutes a new customary norm. The essential 
components of Opinio juris that exist under customary international law are: states 
consent and believing in its legality. 
The theory of consent requires that every state needs to agree to being bound by a 
norm of customary international law. It is said that this theory can easily describe 
intentional customary law making (as may have happened with the 1945 Truman 
Proclamations) — the processes of ‘initiation, imitation and acquiescence 
(Kammerholf, 2004).  
 
However, “It is unlikely that the majority of states actively participate in the making of 
any one norm of customary international law. Most of them will neither consent nor 
protest developments” (Kammerholf, 2004). Consequently, the project focuses on states 
in the case studies and states that are affected by the attack in the region. The leading 
                                                        
9 D’Amato, supra note 3, at 88 quoted in Kammerholf (2004) questions in his article “Uncertainty in the Formal Sources of 
International Law: Customary International Law and Some of Its Problems” 
10 Akehurst, supra note 3 quoted in Kammerholf (2004) questions in his article “Uncertainty in the Formal Sources of International 
Law: Customary International Law and Some of Its Problems” 
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sources are judicial decisions of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), United Nations 
Resolutions and Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). 
In determining whether state practice is consistent with Caroline self-defense principles 
or not, the project focuses on the necessity and the proportionality of the attack. Necessity 
demands that the danger be: “instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no 
moment for deliberation”(Fitzgerald, 2009). In addition, proportionality means that 
“nothing unreasonable or excessive” may be done because the act must be distinctly 
limited by the necessity causing it” (Fitzgerald, 2009). Under the restrictive view of 
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, an armed attack should take place first (U.N. 
Charter art. 51). The principle sources are states speeches, international journals, 
international institutions reports, world organizations that publish reports and studies, 
UN, NPT, and IAEA. These will help in searching for evidence of permission for pre-
emption.  
Case Studies 
In fact, four case studies are elaborated in the project. The possibility of an attack by 
China against North Korea, US invasion of Iraq 2003, Israel bombing Osirak reactor 
1981 and Israel bombing Al Kibar 2007. The common factor in the four cases is the 
occurrence of nuclear threats. In the first case, preemptive self-defense is still a 
possibility and in the second, third and forth cases preemptive self-defense took place.  
The possibility of an attack by China against North Korea is important to evaluate. Both 
states have nuclear weapons. North Korea is not part of the IAEA safeguards anymore. 
The insecurity in the region is alarming. Furthermore, the change of alliances and the 
domestic environment concern China. 
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US invasion of Iraq 2003 is a compelling case. Three main objectives are highlighted 
according to President Bush: Toppling of Saddam regime, Fighting terrorists and 
Dismantling Saddam weapons of mass destruction. However, the project focuses mainly 
on the nuclear weapons threat. Ibp (2005) published US Defense Policy Handbook. It 
explains that the Bush administration formulated a new security policy called “ Bush 
Doctrine” or the “Emerging Threat”. "… A new policy was necessary to prevent the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction among rogue states and terrorist groups …” 
(Ibp, 2005). This doctrine replaces one of the main elements of Caroline principles: the 
imminence of the threat (Mulcahy and Mahony, 2006). In other words, the new policy or 
“The Emerging Threat” doctrine acknowledged was intended to develop preemption 
under customary law to target new threats as WMD.  The international community 
condemned US invasion and considered Bush Doctrine illegal. 
 Israel bombing Osirak in 1981 is a vital case. In fact, Feldman in his article The Bombing 
of Osiraq describes the attack as the first preemptive strike against a nuclear facility.  In 
order to demonstrate the change in Israel’s practice, the project analysis the following: 
How Israel perceived before the attack and in the aftermath? Did they admit it? Did they 
say it was a right to do so and based on what? And how International Community 
reacted? However, the international community after the attack condemned Israel action 
in 1981. 
The turning point was in 2007. Israel bombed Al-Kibar reactor in Syria with the 
encouragement of United States. The most notable part is the aftermath of the attack. The 
International community did not condemn Israel bombardment of Al-Kibar reactor in 
2007. In other words, the international community was silent regarding Israel attack.  
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In fact, in the project Israel, United States and China perspectives are only considered to 
evaluate their change in practice before their attack. Then, the project evaluates the 
aftermath of each case study. Moreover, all the cases are chosen because there is a 
nuclear weapons threat and a self-defense attack is initiated without the occurrence of an 
armed attack based on Article 51 of United Nations. The prominent sources for the case 
studies are World Legal Information Institutes, law libraries, security studies databases, 
United Nations Resolutions and Non-Proliferation Treaty.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE CASE STUDIES 
 
This chapter discusses four instances of state practice that have two common elements. 
They involved a claim of preemptive self-defense used against a nuclear weapons threat.  
This part starts with China’s case because it is consistent with international law and 
customary international law requirements of self-defense in the presence of a nuclear 
threat. Then, the project discusses the cases that exceeded the limits of self-defense in 
international law and preemptive self-defense in customary international law. 
Case Study One: The Possibility of An Attack by China Against North Korea 
 
North Korea Nuclear Problem: 
I. Nuclear Tests: 
In the Fact Sheet: North Korea’s Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programs published by 
Kim (2013) in The Center For Arms Control And Non- Proliferation, North Korea 
nuclear weapons capabilities are set forth: 
North Korea currently possesses between four and eight nuclear weapons. It has 
carried out three nuclear tests since 2006. It has developed and tested a range of 
short- and medium-range missiles, but has yet to successfully test a long-range 
missile or ICBM. It is generally believed to have not yet developed the 
capabilities needed to miniaturize a nuclear device for missile delivery (Kim, 
2013).  
 
The number of nuclear weapons in North Korea is not clear. However, “ the total 
plutonium production suggests between four to eight nuclear weapons” (Kim, 2013). In 
fact, North Korea exercised nuclear testing three times since 2006. 
On October 16, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence confirmed North Korea 
conducted an underground nuclear explosion in the vicinity of P'unggye on 
October 9, 2006. The explosion yield was less than a kiloton, and later said it was 
apparently more successful. One kiloton is far less than other nuclear states’ first 
tests of 10-20 kt. The international community has called the North’s test a failure 
(Kim, 2013).  
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Again in 2009, US intelligence claimed that North Korea exercised nuclear test. 
Nonetheless, “there is a lack of conclusive physical evidence in open sources that proves 
the test was a nuclear one. Official and unofficial reports vary on estimated yield but it is 
generally regarded as higher than its 2006 test” (Kim, 2013).  
The turning point took place in 2013. North Korea exercised a nuclear testing that it 
claimed “…successful and widely deemed successful” (Kim, 2013). However, no 
confirmation on the material that was used. “The estimated yield remains unclear, In 
addition, some experts speculated that the test involved uranium, rather than plutonium as  
in the case of the last two tests, but there has been no official confirmation regarding 
which material was involved in the test” (Kim, 2013).  
It is important to mention that it is not confirmed that North Korea achieved the nuclear 
bomb.  
US Defense Intelligence Agency asserted that it had moderate confidence that 
North Korea had developed this ability. However, this claim has not been 
corroborated by other US or South Korean intelligence agencies. In a May 2013 
analysis, the Arms Control Association’s Greg Thielmann, a Senior Fellow at the 
Arms Control Association, wrote that, Although [North Korea] has hundreds of 
operational short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, there is no evidence that it 
has achieved the miniaturization of a nuclear device necessary for arming these 
missiles (Kim, 2013).  
 
This uncertainty affects China’s perception towards the threat. 
 
II. Article 10 Under NPT and North Korea 
 
Bunn and Rhinelander in their article The Right For Withdraw From The NPT: Article X 
is not unconditional state that: 
Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw 
from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter 
of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give 
notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United 
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Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a 
statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme 
interests. [Article X.1, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] ( 
Bunn and Rhinelander, 2005).  
North Korea withdrew from the NPT since 2006. It gave notice of its withdrawal since 
1993 (Bunn and Rhinelander, 2005). “ The IAEA Board of Governors had referred North 
Korea's noncompliance to the Security Council” however: 
China could not be persuaded to agree with the other P-5 permanent members of 
the UN Security Council (France, Russia, United Kingdom, and United States) 
that the Council should take action to restrain North Korea. All that could be 
agreed was that the Council should call upon North Korea to permit IAEA 
inspections, which North Korea then refused to do (Bunn and Rhinelander, 2005). 
 
The reasons that North Korea stated for its withdrawal were deemed inadequate and  
 
unclear but still China supported North Korea: 
 
North Korea's stated reasons for withdrawal were apparently deemed inadequate by 
most if not all the permanent members of the Council; since the discussions among 
the P-5 have not been made public, we cannot know for certain the positions taken by 
China in 1993 and 2003. However, it appeared in 1993 that China wanted to stimulate 
negotiations by the United States with North Korea and so refused to give the United 
States the assurance that it would not veto a Security Council resolution against North 
Korea if one was presented. By 2003, political tensions had increased, and although 
negotiations were continuing periodically, it appears that Kim Il Jong decided that 
they were not producing enough value for North Korea to stay within the NPT. So it 
withdrew (Bunn and Rhinelander, 2005). 
III. Regional Dimensions: 
 
The Following is a summary of the regional problems that North Korea cause based on 
Smith in his book: Reconstituting Korean Security A Policy Primer 
 
 Cross-Border Illegality and People Smuggling: 
 
The economic conditions within North Korea are not stable. Poverty is found all over 
North Korea. Therefore: 
 
The social safety net cherished under the Kim Il Sung development project has all but 
disappeared. Inequality and absolute poverty serve to keep the threat of starvation 
acute for probably the majority of North Koreans and propel various kinds of cross-
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border illegality: economic migration to China, trafficking in women, armed robbery 
and night-time theft, and smuggling (Smith, n.d.) 
 
 Fear of US: 
 
All governments in the region fear US intervention in North Korea: 
 
South Korea fears the annihilation of Seoul and the crippling of its economy, not to 
speak of the killing, maiming and devastation that would be suffered by millions of 
Koreans. China does not want a war on its borders – especially when it is making 
such profound efforts to develop its north-eastern provinces that border Korea. 
Neither China nor Russia relishes the prospect of being drawn into a hot conflict with 
the United States. Public opinion in both countries would be outraged if the United 
States even attempted a limited ‘‘surgical strike’’ against the North Koreans. Both 
countries have friendship treaties with the DPRK, and China is still formally 
committed to some form of active support of the DPRK in times of war. Even Japan, 
whose alliance with the United States forms the foundation of its foreign policy and 
its existence as a democratic state, has given strong signals to the United States that it 
prefers conflict resolution through negotiation, not confrontation (Smith, n.d.) 
 
 Japan: 
 
North Korea feared Japan given its relationship with the United States and “Tokyo has 
never fully come to grips with its imperialistic past” (Japan and North Korea: Bones of 
Contention, 2005). Moreover, Japan Defence Agency Director Norota Hosei in March 
1999 asserted: 
Japan had the right to launch defensive air strikes against North Korean missile bases, 
a position echoed four years later by his successor, Ishiba Shigeru. While such 
pronouncements may not form a doctrine of pre-emption, as some observers believed, 
they are a new potential threat for North Korea to guard against (Japan and North 
Korea: Bones of Contention, 2005). 
 
 
How China Perceived North Korea Nuclear Weapons? 
North Korea’s Nuclear Threat Challenges China’s Security: 
Based on Plant and Rhode (2013) article China North Korea and the Spread of Nuclear 
Weapons, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, one main challenge that China faces 
regarding North Korea nuclear program is: the possibility of supplying non-state actors 
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with nuclear weapons for financial gain (Plant and Rhode, 2013).  China “ recognizes 
that, in the event that North Korean weapons or HEU were used abroad, the damage to 
Chinese interests could be severe”(Plant and Rhode, 2013). Nuclear terrorism in other 
words challenges China’s security (Plant and Rhode, 2013). This causes another threat 
that indirectly challenges China: the possibility of refuge flows if North Korea nuclear 
weapons caused a conflict in the region or a major war.  
If North Korean HEU does come into the hands of a terrorist group, that group 
will almost certainly try to use it in an improvised nuclear device against civilians, 
most likely in a major city. Even if the HEU were not immediately identified as 
North Korean (current nuclear forensic techniques entail a certain delay before the 
origin of material can be confirmed), any government that had suffered such a 
devastating attack would be under irresistible political pressure to retaliate almost 
immediately. Such a response might or might not itself involve nuclear weapons, 
but it would most likely be overwhelming. It is easy to foresee how a military 
response could escalate into a major war (Plant and Rhode, 2013). 
 
Tiezzi (2014) in her article China Responds to North Korea’s Nuclear Threat explores 
China’s position towards North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. “China’s 
spokesperson Hong Lei told reporters that China has a clear and firm position on the 
Korean nuclear issue, that is, we should stay committed to realizing denuclearization of 
the Korean Peninsula” (Tiezzi, 2014).  Tiezzi further adds that China’s policy towards 
North Korea changed especially after its nuclear test in 2013. U.S. “Secretary of State 
John Kerry recently expressed appreciation for China’s efforts to send a very clear 
message to the North Koreans that [the continued development of a nuclear program] is 
unacceptable to the Chinese ” (Tiezzi, 2014).  
Glaser and Billingsley in their article Reordering Chinese Priorities on the Korean 
Peninsula, elaborate China’s options regarding North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. 
The following are different measures that China took to pressure North Korea. In 2005 a 
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former Foreign Ministry official said, “ in our official exchanges, whenever we talk to the 
North Koreans no matter what issue an official is responsible for, the nuclear issue is 
raised by the Chinese” (Glaser and Billingsley, 2012). Furthermore, “ Chinese leaders 
have used more forceful language with North Korea leader after 2006 nuclear test…” 
(Glaser and Billingsley, 2012). In the Security Council, China supports resolutions that 
condemn North Korea’s nuclear program (Glaser and Billingsley, 2012). 
To sum up, China perceived North Korea’s nuclear program a threat to its security but 
not an imminent one given the uncertainty about the program, as mentioned before. 
However, Plant and Rhode (2013) interpret that China is reluctant to react towards 
North Korea threat.  This is because of two reasons: China and North Korea are 
considered allies and not to provoke its “ troublesome neighbor” (Plant and Rhode, 
2013).  
Would It Be Necessary to attack? 
 
It is mentioned above that North Korea poses a threat against China’s security; however, 
there are reasons that prevent China from taking action. Moreover, China has other 
options than preemptively strike North Korea.  
China’s Influence Over North Korea: 
In order to prevent North Korea from selling its nuclear weapons to the non-state actors, 
China believes that there is “no need to impose the deeply coercive measures it fears 
could precipitate such a crisis, and may even be able to avoid upsetting its relationship 
with Pyongyang. Such tools, to be sure, have been effective in the past and should not be 
neglected entirely” (Plant and Rhode, 2013).  
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Glaser and Billingsley (2012) claim that China has leverage over North Korea. “ China’s 
potential leverage over North Korea is significant, since without the extensive aid that 
Beijing provides, the regime in Pyongyang would be unable to survive”  (Glaser and 
Billingsley, 2012). Glaser and Billingsley quoted the Chinese Foreign Ministry official 
after North Korea’s nuclear test in 2006; “ one lesson that Beijing drew after North Korea  
conducted its first nuclear test in May 2006 was that pressure was necessary to persuade 
Pyoungyang toward denuclearization” (Glaser and Billingsley, 2012). 
The International Atomic Energy Agency and Security Council Resolutions Regarding  
 
North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program: 
 
Based on the IAEA organization fact sheet, North Korea has been in non-compliance 
with the IAEA since 1993. In 2002, the IAEA questioned the implementation of the 
safeguard; however, North Korea did not co-operate (iaea.org, 2014). Then, the IAEA 
passed a resolution requesting North Korea to cooperate with the agency (iaea.org, 2014). 
However, “the DPRK Foreign Minister Paek Nam Sun expressed his disappointment 
about the Agency´s unilateral and unfair approach… it ordered the IAEA inspectors to 
leave the country” (iaea.org, 2014). The IAEA repeated its request “compliance with the 
safeguards” again in 2003. As a result, North Korea’s withdrew from the NPT on 
January 2003. The IAEA organization implied that: 
No agreed statement on the matter has been issued by the NPT States Parties, or 
by the NPT depositary States (Russia, UK and USA), or by the UN Security 
Council. (Article X.1 of the NPT says that a State Party in exercising its national 
sovereignty has the right to withdraw from the Treaty... it shall give notice of such 
withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security 
Council three months in advance... [and] shall include a statement of the 
extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.) 
(iaea.org, 2014).  
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This does not means that North Korea will abandon its safeguards. “ NPT States Parties´ 
comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA provide that such agreements 
would remain in force as long as the State is party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty” 
(iaea.org, 2014).  
After North Korea withdrawal, the IAEA referred the issue to the Security Council in 
February 2003. “The UN Security Council expressed its "concern" over the situation in 
North Korea and said it will keep following developments there. UN Secretary-General 
Annan additionally has appointed a Special Advisor on the North Korea issue” (iaea.org, 
2014).  
Moreover, in 2005 the IAEA director general Mohamed El Baradei welcomed the six 
party talks issue. “The Democratic People´s Republic of Korea (DPRK) would abandon 
its nuclear program in exchange for economic aid and security guarantees” but in 2006 
North Korea launched ballistic missiles (iaea.org, 2014).  
Indeed, inspections continued since 2006 but in 2009, North Korea suspended all 
cooperation with the IAEA (iaea.org, 2014).  
The Arms Control Association determines that the Security Council passed three 
resolutions; they condemn North Korea nuclear testing and requesting it to abide by the 
safeguards system: Resolution 1718, 1874 and 2087. The three resolutions called North 
Korea to rejoin the NPT and to return for negotiations “six-party”. To this date, “UN 
Security Council resolutions have been largely unsuccessful in preventing North Korea 
from advancing its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, although the 
sanctions have slowed development in these areas. The United Nations continues to 
closely monitor these programs” (armscontrol.org, 2013).  
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Therefore, neither the IAEA nor the Security Council stopped North Korea from 
developing Uranium or seeking for the bomb.  
In Conclusion 
 
North Korea nuclear program threatens China’s security; however, China does not 
perceive it as (imminent (instant), overwhelming and leaving no moment of 
deliberation) threat. China follows United Nations self-defense requirements in 
North Korea’s case. In other words, China prefers to utilize different strategies: 
release economic sanctions and provides economic aid given that they are allies 
before initiating a preemptive self-defense attack. The IAEA and Security Council 
are not effective regarding North Korea’s nuclear program. However, China 
respects international law and customary international law requirements for 
preemptive self-defense.   
Case Study Two: United States Invasion of Iraq 2003 (Operation Iraqi 
Freedom): 
 
The United States Invasion of Iraq 2003: 
 
Bassil (2012) in his article The 2003 Iraq War: Operations, Causes, and Consequences 
demonstrates the reasons for the war, its consequences, and United States true intentions. 
Bassil gives a detailed description of the attack: 
It began on March 20, 2003 with the invasion of Iraq known as "Iraqi Freedom 
Operation" by the alliance led by the United States against the Baath Party of 
Saddam Hussein. President George W. Bush has officially declared its completion 
on March 20, 2003, under the banner Mission Accomplished. The invasion led to 
the rapid defeat of the Iraqi army and the capture and execution of Saddam 
Hussein. The United States occupied Iraq and attempted to establish a new 
government. However, violence against the alliance forces rapidly led to an 
asymmetrical war between the insurgents, the U.S. military, and the new Iraqi 
government (Bassil, 2012). 
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Capson (2003) in his report Iraq War: Background and Issues Overview for the congress 
analysis information that led to Iraq war. The attack came after Iraq’s government refused 
to comply with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441 (Copson, 2003).  
US invaded Iraq for three main reasons: Toppling Saddam, Fighting Terrorism and 
Dismantling the Weapons of Mass Destructions (WMD). Although the research 
concentrates on the nuclear weapons threat, facing terrorism and having a dictatorship 
regime increased nuclear weapons hazard, as mentioned before.  
How The United States Perceived Iraq’s Threat? 
United States encountered a nuclear threat that is imminent, overwhelming, left no 
moment of deliberation and no other choice based on US perception of the threat. The 
following is a detailed discussion on the necessity of the attack based on US perception. 
Instant (Imminent) and Overwhelming: 
 
To start, the United States considered Iraq a dictatorship that pose a great danger to the 
world for seeking weapons of mass destruction. The terrorist groups that Iraq supports 
can use these weapons to either strike United States and its allies or use them for 
leverage. On January 29, President George Bush characterized Iraq as one of the three 
evil states: Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. Iraq based on President Bush Description: 
…Has something to hide from the civilized world. States like these and their 
terrorist allies constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. 
By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing 
danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to 
match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United 
States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic  
(Bush State of the Union address, 2002). 
 
Then, in 2003, President Bush gave a speech that reflected US concerns regarding Iraq 
lethal weapons published in the Guardian (2003). “Intelligence gathered by this and other 
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governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some 
of the most lethal weapons ever devised” (The Guardian, 2003). President Bush speech in 
Cincinnati stated “If the Iraqi regime is able to produce, buy, or steal an amount of 
highly-enriched uranium …it could have a nuclear weapon in less than a year” (George 
W. Bush: The Iraqi Threat, 2002).  
Moreover, the US Administration considered Saddam Hussien as the source of the 
threats. President Bush made it clear in his speech in the American Enterprise Institute 
regarding the future of Iraq in 2003: 
In Iraq, a dictator is building and hiding weapons that could enable him to 
dominate the Middle East and intimidate the civilized world -- and we will not 
allow it. (Applause.) We hope that the Iraqi regime will meet the demands of the 
United Nations and disarm, fully and peacefully… If it does not, we are prepared 
to disarm Iraq by force. Either way, this danger will be removed (Applause) 
(George W. Bush: American Enterprise Institute, 2003).  
 
In fact, Iraq used weapons of mass destruction previously against Iran and the Kurdish 
civilians (The Guardian, 2003). Therefore, it would not be impossible for them to use it 
again; “the danger is clear: using chemical, biological or, one day, nuclear weapons, 
obtained with the help of Iraq, the terrorists could fulfill their stated ambitions and kill 
thousands or hundreds of thousands of innocent people in our country, or any other”(The 
Guardian, 2003). 
Consequently, the United States argued that it faced an instant (imminent) and an 
overwhelming threat that has the ability to jeopardize American’s safeness. President 
Bush made this clear when he approached the public in his speech 2003: 
 48 
The safety of the American people depends on ending this direct and growing 
threat. Acting against the danger will also contribute greatly to the long-term 
safety and stability of our world. The current Iraqi regime has shown the power of 
tyranny to spread discord and violence in the Middle East. A liberated Iraq can 
show the power of freedom to transform that vital region, by bringing hope and 
progress into the lives of millions. America's interests in security, and America's 
belief in liberty, both lead in the same direction: to a free and peaceful Iraq 
(Applause) (President George W. Bush Speaks at AEI’s Annual Dinner, 2003).  
 
In fact, President Bush felt the urgency to preempt Iraq. “Instead of drifting along toward 
tragedy, we will set a course toward safety. Before the day of horror can come, before it 
is too late to act, this danger will be removed” (The Guardian, 2003). To be specific, 
President Bush described the urgency of the threat in his speech in 2002 on Iraqi Threat: 
Some ask how urgent this danger is to America and the world. The danger is 
already significant, and it only grows worse with time. If we know Saddam 
Hussein has dangerous weapons today -- and we do -- does it make any sense for 
the world to wait to confront him as he grows even stronger and develops even 
more dangerous weapons? (President George W. Bush: The Iraqi Threat, 2002). 
 
Iraq’s Nuclear Threat Left No Moment Of Deliberation: 
 
 Iraq’s threat did not give according to President Bush any moment of deliberation to 
prevent it. President Bush explained the significance of Iraq’s weapons of mass 
destruction threat in his speech in the Iraqi Threat speech in 2002: 
It gathers the most serious dangers of our age in one place. Iraq's weapons of 
mass destruction are controlled by a murderous tyrant who has already used 
chemical weapons to kill thousands of people. This same tyrant has tried to 
dominate the Middle East, has invaded and brutally occupied a small neighbor, 
has struck other nations without warning, and holds an unrelenting hostility 
toward the United States (President George W. Bush: Iraqi Threat, 2002). 
 
Iraq’s nuclear threat left no moment of deliberation because time is a critical element 
especially in the presence of nuclear threats. On January 14 the President stated in his 
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speech that “time is running out for Iraq to disarm, adding that he was sick and tired of its 
games and deceptions”11(Copson, 2003).  
United States in the United Nations: 
United States brought Iraq’s threat to the United Nations: 
In confronting Iraq, the United States is also showing our commitment to 
effective international institutions. We are a permanent member of the United 
Nations Security Council. We helped to create the Security Council. We believe 
in the Security Council -- so much that we want its words to have meaning. 
(Applause) (The American Enterprise Institute: AEI’s Annual Dinner, 2003). 
 
Katzman (2003) in his paper Iraq: Weapons Threat, Compliance, Sanctions and U.S. 
Policy discusses sanctions and resolutions imposed on Iraq. According to Katzman 
(2003), there are more than seventeen United Nations Resolutions condemning WMD in 
Iraq (Katzman, 2003): 
The Administration and its supporters assert that Iraq was in defiance of 17 
Security Council resolutions requiring that it fully declare and eliminate its 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Further delay in taking action against Iraq, 
they argued, would have endangered national security and undermined U.S. 
Credibility (Copson, 2003). 
 
 Given that inspectors withdrew from Iraq and it was uninspected from 1998 till 2002 
(Katzman, 2003), President Bush gave an important speech that requested the Security 
Council to involve more in Iraq: 
The global threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction cannot be 
confronted by one nation alone. The world needs today and will need tomorrow 
international bodies with the authority and the will to stop the spread of terror and 
chemical and biological and nuclear weapons. A threat to all must be answered by 
all. High-minded pronouncements against proliferation mean little unless the 
strongest nations are willing to stand behind them -- and use force if necessary. 
After all, the United Nations was created, as Winston Churchill said, to "make 
sure that the force of right will, in the ultimate issue, be protected by the right of 
force (Bush, 2003).   
                                                        
11 “President’s Remarks on Iraq,” January 14, 2003 [http://www.whitehouse.gov] quoted in Copson, 2003) Iraq War: Background and 
Issues Overview” 
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Then in 2002, the United Nations Security Council adopted one of the main resolutions 
that targets Iraq’s WMD “Resolution 1441”. The following are the main provisions: 
(1) Declaring Iraq in material breach of pre-existing resolutions; (2) giving Iraq 7 
days to accept the resolution and 30 days (until December 8) to provide a full 
declaration of all WMD programs; (3) requiring new inspections to begin within 
45 days (December 23) and an interim progress report within 60 days thereafter 
(no later than February 21, 2003); (4) declaring all sites, including presidential 
sites, subject to unfettered inspections; (5) giving UNMOVIC the right to 
interview Iraqis in private, including taking them outside Iraq, and to freeze 
activity at a suspect site; (6) forbidding Iraq from taking hostile acts against any 
country upholding U.N. resolutions, a provision that would appear to cover Iraq’s 
defiance of the “no fly zones;” and (7) giving UNMOVIC the authority to report 
Iraqi non-compliance and the Security Council as a whole the opportunity to meet 
to consider how to respond to Iraqi non-compliance” (Katzman, 2003). 
 
Iraq accepted the resolution, allowed inspections and submitted its declarations on 
nuclear weapons materials. However, “after comparing the Iraqi declaration to U.S. 
intelligence assessments, the Bush Administration said on December 19, 2002 that there 
were material omissions that constitute a further material breach of Iraq’s 
obligations”(Katzman, 2003). Moreover, United Nations considered Iraq as “failing to 
clear up outstanding questions, although the United Nations did not call the declaration a 
material breach of Resolution 1441” (Katzman, 2003). 
The IAEA head announced in the Security Council that Iraq did not adhere to UN 
Resolution 1441. However, it “has been providing more active cooperation over the past 
month and that inspections were making progress, including some substantive 
disarmament destruction of the Al Samoud II missile” (Katzman, 2003). 
 In fact, the United Nations criticism towards Iraq’s nuclear weapons benefited President 
Bush: 
In his State of the Union message on January 28, and in subsequent statements, 
President Bush has used U.N. criticism, as well as citations of U.S. intelligence 
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findings, to assert that Iraq is not disarming voluntarily and would be disarmed, 
by force if necessary, with or without U.N. authorization (Katzman, 2003). 
 
The turning point was on February 2003 when Colin Powell went to the Security Council 
in the United Nations and showed the members: “several pictures of vehicles used as 
mobile biological research laboratories, satellite photos of military plants, chemical 
weapons bunkers, and a recording of a conversation between the officers of the Iraqi 
Republican Guard who speak about weapons of mass destruction” (Bassil, 2011). 
However, Russia, China, and France threatened to use their veto to prevent military 
intervention in Iraq (Bassil, 2011).  
Although the United States had other peaceful methods to handle Iraq’s threat as more 
negotiations and inspections, the U.S decided to attack Iraq without the approval of 
the Security Council. 
The Aftermath of The Attack 
The United States Invasion of Iraq 2003 Was Not Necessary (Instant, Overwhelming, 
No Moment Of Deliberation and No Other Choice): 
 
According to WMD in Iraq: evidence and implications report by Cirincione, Mathews, 
Pekovich &Perkovich (2004), Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction was “a long-term threat 
but not an imminent threat to the United States, to the region, or to global security” 
(Cirincione, Mathews, Perkovich & Orton, 2004). In fact, Iraq’s Weapons Of Mass 
Destruction program was dismantled before (Cirincione, Mathews, Perkovich & Orton, 
2004). The report maintained that: 
The dramatic shift between prior intelligence assessments and the October 2002 
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), together with the creation of an independent 
intelligence entity at the Pentagon and other steps, suggest that the intelligence 
community began to be unduly influenced by policymakers’ views sometime in 
2002 (Cirincione, Mathews, Perkovich & Orton, 2004).  
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Regarding United States claims that Iraq supported terrorists and support them with 
Weapons of mass destruction: “There was and is no solid evidence of a cooperative 
relationship between Saddam’s government and Al Qaeda. There was no evidence to 
support the claim that Iraq would have transferred WMD to Al Qaeda and much evidence 
to counter it” (Cirincione, Mathews, Perkovich & Orton, 2004).  
There are three main points that the United States disregarded when it invaded Iraq 2003. 
Firstly, “treating nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons as a single WMD threat the 
conflation of three distinct threats, very different in the danger they pose, distorted the 
cost/benefit analysis of the war” (Cirincione, Mathews, Perkovich & Orton, 2004). 
Secondly, US did not have evidence for its claims and it considered that “Saddam 
Hussein would give whatever WMD he possessed to terrorists” as a given truth 
(Cirincione, Mathews, Perkovich & Orton, 2004). Finally, the report accused United 
States of using the findings to turn “threats from minor to dire” (Cirincione, Mathews, 
Perkovich & Orton, 2004). 
Moreover, Sifris (2003) in his article Operation Iraqi Freedom: United States V Iraq- 
The Legality of the war evaluates Iraq 2003 invasion based on legal requirements of self-
defense. Sifris (2003) states that “It seems that in the 2003 war against Iraq, as with the 
Israeli bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981, the use of force was employed to 
counter attacks that the US deemed likely to occur at an unspecified time in the future, 
and was not employed to counter an imminent threat” (Sifris, 2003). Sifris (2003) 
quoted Greenwood articulation “ If there was no threat of an imminent attack and the 
United States was merely trying to counter attacks which it considered likely to occur at 
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some unspecified time in the future, the raid would not have been a lawful exercise of 
self-defense” (Sifris, 2003). 
Other Options For The United States: 
In fact, the United Nations could have solved Iraq threat without United States military 
intervention in 2003. It could have been better if US waited for more inspections by the 
United Nations. In other words, “The UN inspection process appears to have been much 
more successful than recognized before the war. Nine months of exhaustive searches by 
the U.S. and coalition forces suggest that inspectors were actually in the process of 
finding what was there. Thus, the choice was never between war and doing nothing about 
Iraq’s WMD” (Cirincione, Mathews, Perkovich & Orton, 2004). Other means to 
dismantle Iraq could have taken place; for instance, sanctions, more investigations and 
control mechanisms on import and export (Cirincione, Mathews, Perkovich & Orton, 
2004). One of the criticisms to the United States is ignoring scientists and UNMOVIC 
experts who have worked in Iraq (Cirincione, Mathews, Perkovich & Orton, 2004). 
Cirincione, Mathews, Perkovich & Orton in (2004) maintained that there were two 
options for US rather than military intervention:  
Considering all the costs and benefits, there were at least two options clearly 
preferable to a war undertaken without international support: allowing the 
UNMOVIC/IAEA inspections to continue until obstructed or completed, or 
imposing a tougher program of “coercive inspections” backed by a specially 
designed international force (Cirincione, Mathews, Perkovich & Orton, 2004). 
 
To sum up, United States invasion of Iraq did not meet the necessity factor for 
preemptive self-defense. 
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United States Invasion of Iraq 2003 was not Proportional To The Threat: 
The death toll in Iraq after US invasion of Iraq 2003 is discussed by Roberts (2004) in his 
article Mortality Before and After The Invasion of Iraq in 2003. The article states that: 
Whatever figure is quoted for deaths, it seems that the civilian casualties of the 
war in Iraq run into many thousands and the number is still mounting. What is 
undisputed is that thousands of families in Iraq have lost loved ones to violent 
deaths. The psychological effects of the shock-and heavy bombardment and what 
it implies for the Iraqi nation will only become clear when Iraqis have the chance 
to think and life returns to some degree of normality, which might be a long time 
from now (Roberts, 2004). 
 
Bassil in his article assist the consequences of the US invasion of Iraq. He maintains that 
“In 2008, the total cost of operations was about$3000 billion which has already surpassed 
that of twelve years of the Vietnam War, and twice the cost of the Korean War” (Bassil, 
2011). Moreover, insecurity took place in Iraq after the invasion. In other words, “An 
increase in the general insecurity in Iraq including terrorist attacks, theft, assault, murder, 
hostage taking… An unstoppable humanitarian crisis in Iraq…  A Setback or progress of 
law including in international law, and in human rights” (Bassil, 2011). 
United States Invasion of Iraq is Not Consistent With Article 51: 
In fact, the United States invasion of Iraq violated the United Nations Charter.  
Hamauswa and Manyeruke in their article A Critique of United States’ Application of 
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter in Iraq and Afghanistan, criticize the use of 
force concept especially in US invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq.  According to 
Hamauswa and Manyeruke (2013), resolution 1441 of the Security Council considered 
Iraq breached its obligations under previous resolutions and that there were consequences 
of this act (Hamauswa and Manyeruke, 2013). Consequently, “US took the responsibility 
of the UN Security Council though the UN Charter does not provide for such an action. 
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The world will not be safe if a single country can supersede the international collective 
security” (Hamauswa and Manyeruke, 2013). Article 51 of United Nations specified that 
an attack should take place first in order to initiate a self-defense attack. However, Iraq 
did not attack the United States. Secretary-General of the United Nations Kofi Anan in an 
interview Lessons of Iraq war underscore importance of UN Charter, he maintained that 
United States attack was illegal and not consistent with Article 51 of United Nations (UN 
Service Section, 2004). Anan added "And I hope we do not see another Iraq-type 
operation for a long time " (Lessons of Iraq war underscore importance of UN Charter – 
Annan, 2004).  
Therefore, United States attack is not consistent with Article 51 of United Nations. 
The invasion of Iraq was not based on preemptive self-defense under Caroline 
Doctrine and it was not based on Article 51 of United Nations. In fact, United States 
attack is considered illegal under International Law. 
United States Interpreted the Attack Based On The Bush Doctrine: 
Bush doctrine was formulated after September 11, 2001 attacks. “ The kernel of the 
doctrine is that unilateral preemptive force may be used even in instances where an attack 
by an enemy has neither taken place or is imminent” (Mulcahy and Mahony, 2006). In 
fact, Bush doctrine targets states and terrorists that are developing weapons of mass 
destruction (Mulcahy and Mahony, 2006). Arend (2003) states that Bush doctrine 
replaces one main element of Caroline principle: necessity of the attack. “…It seeks to 
relax the traditional requirement of necessity”(Arned, 2003). The Bush Administration’s 
National Security Strategy in (Mulcahy and Mahony, 2006): 
We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of 
today’s adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using 
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conventional means… if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the 
enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries the US 
will if necessary act preemptively (Mulcahy and Mahony, 2006).  
Abraham Sofaer (op cit in Mulcahy and Mahony, 2006), admits that “…While it is 
generally accepted that the nature of warfare has changed over the past six decades… 
One can reasonably conclude that the emerging threat doctrine conflicts with both the UN 
Charter and also the pre-charter customary law” (Mulcahy and Mahony, 2006).  
Moreover, Eckert and Mofidi (op cit in Mulcahy and Mahony, 2006) conclude that Bush 
Doctrine is not “comport” with Article 51 of United Nations Charter from both liberal 
and restrictionist’s point of view (Mulcahy and Mahony, 2006).  
Record (2003) in his article The Bush Doctrine and War With Iraq, evaluates the doctrine 
that US used within the Iraqi war 2003. Accordingly, Bush Doctrine demonstrates that 
“Cold War concepts of deterrence and containment do not necessarily work against 
WMD-seeking rogues states and are irrelevant against terrorist organizations” (Record, 
2003). Therefore, United States invasion in Iraq 2003 was based on Bush Doctrine. 
“According to the Bush Doctrine, rogue states are a double threat; they not only seek to 
acquire WMD for themselves but also could transfer them to terrorist allies” (Record, 
2003).  In fact, “The USANSS made it clear that the US was not going to wait for its 
enemies to attack first. This again makes sense when there is a serious threat from an 
enemy with nuclear weapons” (Hamauswa and Manyeruke, 2013). 
International Community Responses 
European Countries and China 
France, Russia, and Germany were the main states that refused the military intervention 
by United States in Iraq 2003. “On February 10, at a press conference in Paris with 
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President Putin of Russia, Chirac said nothing today justifies war. Speaking of weapons 
of mass destruction, Chirac added I have no evidence that these weapons exist in 
Iraq”12(Copson, 2003).  They as well as China preferred more inspections (Copson, 
2003). After the US invaded Iraq, “on March 19, Russia’s Prime Minister Vladimir Putin  
charged that this military action cannot be justified in any way” 13(Copson, 2003).   
The United Nations and IAEA Response: 
In March 2003, the Security Council held First Debate On Iraq Since Start Of Military 
Action; Speakers Call For Halt To Aggression, Immediate Withdrawal. It “called on to 
end the illegal aggression and demand the immediate withdrawal of invading forces, by 
an overwhelming majority of this afternoon’s 45 speakers”(Resolution 7705, 2003). 
Moreover, members of the council maintained that United States invasion was a violation 
of international law and United Nations Charter (Resolution 7705, 2003). Then, Koffi 
Annan in the first debate on Iraq stated: 
Faith in the United Nations could only be restored if the Council was able to 
identify and work constructively towards specific goals, he said.  He urged the 
five permanent members, in particular, to show leadership by making a concrete 
effort to overcome their differences.  He emphasized two guiding principles, 
which should underpin all the Council’s future decisions on Iraq.  The first 
principle was respect for Iraq’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and 
independence.  The second, which flowed logically from the first, was respect for 
the right of the Iraqi people to determine their own political future and control 
over their own natural resources (Resolution 7705, 2003). 
 
Iraq and The Arab World Response: 
The Arab countries and Non-Aligned Movement requested the Security Council in 
Resolution 7705 to “urge the international community to ensure that the sovereignty and 
                                                        
12 “U.S.-Europe Rifts Widen Over Iraq,” Washington Post, February 11, 2003 quoted in Copson (2003) “Iraq War: Background and 
issues Overview” 
13 Wave of Protests, From Europe to New York,” New York Times, March 21, 2003 quoted in Copson (2003) “Iraq War: Background 
and issues Overview” 
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integrity of Iraq were fully preserved.  The right of the Iraqi people to determine their 
political future and exercise control over their natural resources should also be fully 
respected…” (Resolution 7705, UN). Furthermore, Mohamed El Douri, Iraq 
representative, gave a strong speech condemning the attack:  
 Sanctions, which have lasted for almost 13 years, were also having a terrible 
effect on the country.  The goal of changing the regime in his country, which had 
been proclaimed by the United States, constituted a blatant violation of 
international law and the Charter of the United Nations… The Council must take 
action to make sure that the rules of international law were observed, he 
continued.  While the aggressors said that their goal was disarmament of Iraq, 
everybody knew that they were not the ones tasked with that mandate.  The 
inspections during several months had found no evidence of weapons of mass 
destruction or proscribed activities within Iraq.  The real reason was occupation of 
the country, its re-colonization and controlling its oil wealth (Resolution 7705, 
2003). 
 
In a Nutshell, the international community condemned United States invasion in 
Iraq 2003. It considered the military invasion an aggression and a violation under 
international law. 
Conclusion 
The United States invaded Iraq for three main reasons: Toppling Saddam, Fighting 
Terrorism and Dismantling the Weapons of Mass Destructions (WMD). However, 
these threats were not imminent and they left other choices to the United States 
rather than the military intervention. The invasion was not proportional to the 
threats that United States perceived. United States military intervention was not 
based on Caroline Principles or Article 51 of the United Nations. Nonetheless, it was 
based on Bush Doctrine. The international community condemned the invasion. 
Therefore, United States invasion in Iraq 2003 violated international law. 
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Case Study Three: Israel Bombing Osirak Reactor in Iraq (Operation 
Opera) 1981 
 
Israel Attacked Osirak Reactor in 1981: 
 
Ford (2004) in his thesis Israel’s Attack On Osiraq: A Modern For Future Preventive 
Strikes elaborates Osirak Attack. According to Ford (2004), the conflict started since 
1975 when Iraq approached France to acquire a nuclear weapons reactor (Ford, 2004). 
“Hussein perceived Iraq an oil-rich nation, needed a nuclear weapon to balance against 
Israel and as a status symbol”(Ford, 2004). However, Israel refused this decision. Uri 
Bar-Joseph (op. cite in ford, 2004) demonstrates that Israel rejection was “because of 
Israel’s vulnerability and the nature of the Arab regimes-especially that of Saddam 
Hussein”14 (Ford, 2004).   
Moreover, Brower (2008) in his thesis Preemption and Precedent: The Significant of 
Iraq (1981) and Syria (2007) for an Israeli Response to An Iranian Nuclear Threat 
precisely describes the Israeli attack on Osirak as: 
Israel sent Eight F-16As, each carrying two Mk-84 2,000 lb. bombs with delayed 
fuses, along with six F-15As… The F- 16 dove at the Osirak reactor to release 
their bombs. Seven of the eight pilots successfully deployed their bombs directly 
on the reactor’s dome … and returned much the same way they had come 
15
(Brower, 2008). 
 
In an Israeli statement according to The Osirak Attack article (n.d.), the Israeli 
government announced that “sources of unquestioned reliability told us that it was  
intended, despite statements to the contrary, for the production of atomic bombs ” (The 
Osirak Attack, n.d.).   
                                                        
14 Amos Perlmutter, Michael I. Handel, and Uri Bar-Joseph, Two Minutes over Baghdad, 2nd ed. (London;Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 
2003), xl quoted in Ford (2004) “ Israel’s Attack On Osiraq: A Modern For Future Preventive Strikes?” 
15 Raas and Long, 11 quoted in Brower (2008) “Preemption and Precedent: The Significant of Iraq” and Syria (2007) for an Israeli 
Response to An Iranian Nuclear Threat” 
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In fact, Ford (2004) considers Israel attack as one of the most significant attacks in the 
twentieth century (Ford, 2004). “Every nation seeking to acquire nuclear weapons took 
notice, especially those in the Middle East. This strike added fuel to a region already 
ablaze with the turmoil” (Ford, 2004). In addition, Kirschenbaum (2010) in his article 
Operation Opera: an Ambiguous Success explains Israel strategic objectives and their 
effects on Iraqi Capabilities. Kirschenbaum induces that “While there is no scholarly 
consensus on the relative success or failure of the Israeli operation, it was certainly a 
tactical masterpiece and a strategic enigma”(Kirschenbaum, 2010). 
How Did Israel Perceive Osirak Threat? 
Israel Considered The Attack Necessary: 
Based on Israel perception of Iraq’s nuclear threat, Israel faced a nuclear threat that is 
instant, overwhelming, left no moment of deliberation and no other choice. Israel 
decision to attack the Osirak reactor was largely influenced by two reasons; namely, 
Israel survival and monopoly of nuclear weapons in the region. The following is a 
detailed discussion on Israel perception of Iraq’s threat. 
Iraq Threat was instant (imminent) and overwhelming: 
Israel survival was the Target. The Osirak Attack (n.d.) article and Boudreau (1993) in 
his article The Bombing of The Osirak Reactor mention that Israel was the target (The 
Osirak Attack, n.d; Boudreau, 1993). In an Israeli Statement of 8 June stated that: 
The goal for these bombs was Israel this was explicitly stated by the Iraqi ruler. 
After the Iranians slightly damaged the reactor, Saddam Hussein remarked that it 
was pointless for the Iranians to attack the reactor because it was being built 
against Israel alone (The Osirak Attack, n.d.; Ford, 2004).  
 
Moreover, Menachem Begin feared the repetition of the Holocaust catastrophe as a 
worst-case scenario. Ariel Sharon, in the Ministry of Defense 1981, maintained that it 
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was a matter of survival. “The third element in our defense policy for the 1980’s is our 
determination to present confrontation states from gaining access to nuclear weapons… 
for us it is not a question of a balance of terror but a question of survival” (Bourdeau, 
1993).  
In fact, the severity of the threat was reflected in Begin’s statement of 8 June: 
Within a short time, the Iraqi reactor would have been in operation and hot. In 
such conditions, no Israeli Government could have decided to blow it up. This 
would have caused a huge wave of radioactivity over the city of Baghdad and its 
innocent citizens would have been harmed (The Osirak Attack, n.d.). 
 
Looking back to Israel-Iraq history: “Iraq has never signed a cease-fire or recognized 
Israel as a nation and has never joined in any peace effort” (Feldman, 1982). Therefore, 
Iraq could have had the intention to use the bomb against Israel. Ford (2004) adds “ Iraq 
also proved its hostility toward Israel by remaining outside the 1949 Armistice agreement 
and not recognizing the legitimacy of Israel as a state” (Ford, 2004).  The relationship 
between the two states did not allow any cooperation. Ford (2004) quoted Iraqi 
Ambassador statement before the Arab summit in 1978 “Iraq does not accept the 
existence of a Zionist state in Palestine the only solution is war”16(Ford, 2004).  
Moreover, Iraq used chemical weapons against its neighbors previously so it would be 
possible to attack Israel as well: 
During the Iran-Iraq war, Israel observed Iraq’s merciless use of chemical 
weapons. Hussein took no care in launching the deadly poison as long as he 
received benefit from its use. Israel noted that Hussein’s use of these weapons 
was against people whom he professed not to hate. How much more devastating 
would an attack be on those whom he professed to hate? (Ford, 2004) 
 
Israel considered it a threat against its Monopoly of Nuclear Weapons and its position 
within the region. Power (1986) elaborates Israel perceptions towards Iraq in The 
                                                        
16 See Nakdimon pages 79 and 97 quoted in Ford (2004) “ Israel’s Attack On Osiraq: A Modern For Future Preventive Strikes?” 
 62 
Baghdad Raid: Retrospect and Prospect. Power (1986) explains that: 
The tap root of the Osiraq strike was the perception of Israeli Labour and Likud-
led coalition governments that Iraq's emerging nuclear activities would sooner or 
later conflict with Israel's Middle Eastern nuclear-bomb monopoly (Power, 1986).  
 
Indeed, Marshall (1980) in his article Iraqi Nuclear Program Halted by Bombing 
explores the effects of air strikes wars against nuclear plants. Marshall (1980) proclaims 
that Israel feared the creation of the first Arab bomb in the Middle East or training 
generations that will eventually build the bomb (Marshall, 1980). Therefore, “Israel 
military specialists are convinced that if the 1981 air strike had not been undertaken, such 
a capability would have meant a totally different strategic balance facing US, moderate 
Arabs, Western Nations” (Bourdreau, 1993). 
To conclude, Israel survival and its monopoly of nuclear weapons in the region 
maintain the imminence and the Overwhelming of the threat. 
Iraq’s Nuclear Threat Left No Moment of Deliberation: 
 
The Israeli government knew the date for the completion of the reactor. “Highly reliable 
sources gave us two dates for the completion of the reactor and its operation: the first, the 
beginning of July 1981, the second, the beginning of September this year”(The Osirak 
Attack, n.d.). In other words: 
The Israeli Government justified the timing based on intelligence reporting that 
Osirak was soon to receive its first shipment of fuel and commence operations. 
According to Begin, once active, the reactor's destruction would have spread 
radiation fallout throughout Baghdad 
17
 although there are scholars who 
questioned the time (Kirschenbaum, 2010). 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
17 Government of Israel, "The Iraqi Threat," p.2. "[The] timing was dictated by the fact that the reactor was due to become critical 
between July and September of 1981, after which radioactive release could have entailed injury to civilians." cited in Kirschenbaum 
(2010)” Operation Opera: an Ambiguous Success.” 
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The Aftermath of The Attack 
The Attack was not necessary: The threat was not (Instant (imminent), Overwhelming 
and No Moment of Deliberation and left other options: 
Greenwood (2003) maintains the lack of an imminent threat in Iraq 1981: 
Although international reaction to the 1981 Israeli attack on Iraq’s nuclear reactor, 
on the other hand, was generally condemnatory of Israel, in most cases that 
reaction was based on a conclusion that Israel had failed to demonstrate that there 
was an imminent threat from Iraq and had thus failed to demonstrate Caroline 
requirements… (Greenwood, 2003) 
 
Israel followed different paths to prevent Iraq from acquiring the nuclear weapons; 
however, Saddam Hussein “ joined the nuclear club” (Ford, 2004; Brower 2008). Israel 
options included: media and information campaign, diplomatic pressures, International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), United States assistance, and Economic Sanctions 
(Ford, 2004; Brower, 2008). However, Israel did not bring the issue to the Security 
Council in United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 
1. Media and Information Campaign: 
Media was one of the overt routes that Israel targeted. Israel initiated a campaign to 
spread awareness of Iraq’s nuclear threat (Ford, 2004). The following are different 
examples: 
London Daily published on January 10, 1976, Iraq is soon liable to achieve a 
capacity for producing nuclear weapons. One of the most unstable states in the 
Arab world would be the largest and most advanced in the Middle East. The paper 
added that France would be powerless to impose effective control over the use to 
which the Iraqis would put it
18
(Ford, 2004). Also, A London newspaper reported 
on March 20, 1980: Next year, Iraq will be capable of manufacturing a nuclear 
bomb with the assistance of France and Italy. France provides the enriched 
uranium, Italy: the know-how and technology (Ford, 2004). During July1980, 
U.S. Media published a startling declaration by President Carter: The United 
States would not attempt to impose it views upon states with a nuclear capability 
                                                        
18 From: Nakdimon, First Strike . page 63,79,114,115,115,125,126,131,132,133,and 147 quoted in Ford (2004) “ Israel’s Attack On 
Osiraq: A Modern For Future Preventive Strikes?” 
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such as France- with regard to the Mideast (Ford, 2004). 
 
Furthermore, Israel initiated an information campaign in France to pressure and inform 
the public of the nuclear threat of Osirak reactor (Brower, 2008). “The committee’s 
chairman Moshe Arens, argued for persuading Western countries to induce them to 
prevent Iraq from going nuclear”19 however, with no tangible effect (Brower, 2008). 
Israeli Director General Prime Minister’s Office Matti Shmuelevitz, told the German 
newspaper Die Welt that “Israel cannot afford to sit idle and wait until an Iraqi bomb 
drops on our heads”(Brower, 2008).  
2. Diplomatic Pressure: 
Since the announcement of a deal between France and Iraq, Israel focused on diplomatic 
pressure (Marshall, 1980). According to Ford (2004), Israel engaged in six to seven years 
of diplomatic pressure to prevent Iraq from getting the reactor (Ford, 2004; Brower, 
2008). The diplomatic pressure was mainly on France, West Germany and Italy (Ford, 
2004; Bower, 2008).  “The most important part of Israel’s diplomatic effort is the sheer 
number of attempts Israel made to convince France to abandon its support of Iraq”20 
(Ford, 2004); For example: 
The Israeli Foreign Minister, Yigal Alon, paid a working visit to Paris as the draft 
Franco-Iraqi agreement reached its final stages of completion…In his talks with 
the three main pillars of the French administration, Pres. Giscard, Premier Chirac 
and Foreign Minister Jean Sauvagn argues, Alon conveyed Israel’s concern over 
the possibility of Iraq’s misuse of the nuclear technology and fuels whose 
purchase it was negotiating with France. They all gave the official French position 
though not a party to the NPT, France would continue (Ford, 2004; Brower, 
2008).  
 
Additionally, personal appeals were used to stop Iraq-France deal however, Israel failed. 
  
                                                        
19 Nakdimon, 130-131 quoted in Arng (2008) “Pre-emption and Precedent: The Significant Of Iraq (1981) and Syria (2007) For an 
Israeli Response to An Iranian Nuclear Threat” 
20 From: Nakdimon, First Strike, page 56,63,66,75,83,88,96,99,138,144,152,174,180 quoted in Ford (2004) “ Israel’s Attack On 
Osiraq: A Modern For Future Preventive Strikes?” 
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Shimon Peres, a close friend of Chirac’s, personally asked him to cancel his 
recent contact with Hussein. But Chirac was unwilling to turn his back on the deal 
in which Iraq guaranteed oil contracts, weapon purchases, and automobile 
purchases in exchange for the Osiris nuclear reactor and seventy-two kilograms of 
weapons-grade, enriched uranium for start-up fuel (Brower, 2008). 
 
 3. Economic Sanctions: 
The economic means were not used by Israel in preventing Iraq from acquiring the threat 
because no economic ties existed with Baghdad (Brower, 2008). Subsequently, Israel had 
to encourage other states and the Security Council to impose economic sanctions on Iraq 
(Brower, 2008). However, Israel failed in pushing the United Nations to impose 
economic sanctions on Iraq because Iraq is part of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and 
the organization did not record any violation against Iraq
21
 (Brower, 2008).  
4. Assistance From United States:  
Israel diplomatic efforts targeted US to convince them of the danger of Osirak reactor 
(Ford, 2004). However, Israel lost faith easily in the United States (Ford, 2004): 
President Carter reversed plans in July 1980. He claimed his administration would 
not interfere with other nuclear-equipped countries and their Mideast affairs. Also 
in 1980, U.S. policymakers decided to continue unfruitful diplomatic approaches 
to France instead of backing direct Israeli pressure on Iraq (Ford, 2004).  
 
5. Israel Perception of International Atomic Energy Agency: 
Israel is not part of the NPT treaty and IAEA. The International Atomic Energy Agency 
was not effective according to Israel Atomic Commission to handle Iraq’s nuclear threat. 
The Israel Atomic Energy Commission in (Feldman, 1982) challenges the effectiveness 
of the IAEA. Firstly, it lacks measures that detect experiments:“ … No inspection 
procedures exist for monitoring experiments within the reactor core itself making it 
                                                        
21 UN, Department of Public Information, Yearbook of the United Nations 1981, UNYearbook.un.org, 
http://unyearbook.un.org/unyearbook.html?name=1981index.html (accessed 19 February 2011), 275 quoted in Arng (2008) “Pre-
emption and Precedent: The Significant Of Iraq (1981) and Syria (2007) For an Israeli Response to An Iranian Nuclear Threat” 
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possible for Iraq to produce weapons-grade plutonium within the reactor in a manner 
unobservable to IAEA”22 (Feldman, 1982).  
Secondly, in conducting researchers according to Israel states do not have to clarify their 
reasons to the inspectors. Accounts of the declared fuel are the required data by the 
inspectors (Feldman, 1982): 
With respect to a large MTR such as Osiraq, this limitation permits the insertion 
of various targets, including undeclared natural uranium for which the reactor 
operation is not accountable to the inspector”(Feldman, 1982).  Besides, 
Inspections were intended to account for the HEU fuel and related activities. For 
this reason, Israel worried that the natural uranium targets, produced from 
yellowcake freely and legally purchased on international markets, would be 
outside the purview of the IAEA's inspectors (Kirschenbaum, 2010). 
 
 The effective method according to Israel Atomic Energy Commission is “…round the 
clock, continuous on the spot control”(Feldman, 1982). Finally, Israel believed that Iraq 
could have unloaded its natural uranium before every inspection especially that “ IAEA 
inspections are intermittent and advance notice must be given prior to the inspectors 
arrival”(Feldman, 1982).  In addition, the IAEA does not provide inspections based on 
accusations and Israel thought that Iraq would withdraw from the NPT before having the 
bomb (Boudreau, 1993).  
To sum up, it was not necessary to strike Osirak. Israel did not notify the Security 
Council and the IAEA, but it notified the international community that it would 
reconsider its options to address Iraq’s nuclear threat.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
22 Government of Israel, "Iraqi Nuclear Threat," p. 19 quoted in Feldman (1982): The Bombing of Osiraq 
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Israel Attack Against Iraq’s Nuclear Reactor was Proportional to the Threat: 
Physical Results: 
Basically, Israel attacked only the reactor. The following is a detail description of the 
attack: 
The attack destroyed the complex, comprising a French-built Osiris-type 
Materials Testing Reactor (MTR), as well as a smaller adjacent reactor. The two 
reactors were known in Iraq as Tammuz-I and Tammuz-II. The Israeli jets 
returned to their bases unscathed, and Iraq, which was in the midst of a war with 
Iran (which had the year before bombed but not destroyed the site), did not 
retaliate militarily (Kirschenbaum, 2010). 
 
 In order to minimize the number of casualties, Israel initiated a limited war.  
 …Destroying the reactor, attacking on a quiet Sunday afternoon with few people 
present, immediately leaving the airspace following the attack and bombing 
before the introduction of fissile material into the reactor
23
 (Weise, 2012).  
 
 
To be precise, Israel “ …hit the research site about 10 miles from the center of Baghdad. 
They damaged an auxiliary building and forced the French technicians working on the 
project to leave”(Marshall, 1980). An Iraqi scientist who worked on the Osirak reactor, 
Khidhir Hamza, (op cit in Ford, 2004) describes the consequences of the attack; the 
attack totally destructed the reactor
24
 (Ford, 2004). The attack was proportional in terms 
of reaching its target; namely, destroying the reactor. It succeeded in destroying 
plutonium that is used in developing the bomb (Ford, 2004). The effects of the attack is 
determined by Ford (2004): 
This process was more time-consuming and wrought with expensive, 
sophisticated, and scarce scientific material. The Osiraq reactor alone had cost the 
Iraqi government $300 million dollars to purchase from the French government. 
Iraq was now funding two wars, one against the Iranians and the other against 
                                                        
23 See Eichensehr, supra note 28, at 73, 76 (noting the presence of the first three criteria, and stating that “Israel bombed the Osiraq 
reactor one month before it was to become operational . . . . Israel defended the timing 
of its action by claiming that it attacked at the last time when bombing the reactor would not have caused release of nuclear radiation 
that could have endangered civilians in Baghdad.”) quoted in Weise (2012) 
24 Khidhir Abd al-Abb as Hamzah and Jeff Stein, Saddam's Bombmaker : The Terrifying inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and 
Biological Weapons Agenda  (New York: Scribner, 2000), 129  quoted in Ford (2004) “ Israel’s Attack On Osiraq: A Modern For 
Future Preventive Strikes?” 
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nuclear non-proliferation (Ford, 2004).  
 
Marshall (1980) declares that as a consequence of the attack, Iraq’s program was stopped 
for one or two years (Marshall, 1980). Similarly, Fieldman (op cit in Ford, 2004) claims 
“Osiraq’s destruction slowed the pace of Iraq’s nuclear program. Even if Iraq could 
replace its loss with an identical reactor, which now seems likely, some 3 to 4 years will 
have been gained”25(Ford, 2004). Therefore, the Israel act was restricted by the 
necessity causing it.  
The Attack is not Consistent With Article 51 of United Nations: 
 
Many scholars considered Israel attack as an act of aggression. In other words, “…the 
plea of self-defense is untenable where no armed attack has taken place or is 
imminent”(Brower, 2003). Pogany(1981) evaluates in his article “The Destruction of 
Osirak: A Legal Perspective” Israel justification for the attack through applying Article 
51 of UN and Caroline principles to the attack. Since both states are members of the 
United Nations, they are obliged to abide by the Charter (Pogany, 1981). Article 2(4) 
according to Pogany (1981) is breached by Israel attack. In addition, Israel did not submit 
the issue to the Security Council before launching the attack (Weise, 2012). Pogany 
(1981) on the legality of the attack mentions: 
It seems clear that the Israeli action was in breach of these provisions. The 
destruction of the Iraqi reactor cannot be deemed a 'peaceful' means of settling a 
dispute, and it has clearly endangered international peace and security. More- 
over, the Israeli operation was a use of armed force, within the meaning of Article 
2 (4), which violated both the territorial integrity and political independence of 
Iraq (Pogany, 1981).  
 
Furthermore, “A literal interpretation of Article 51 would suggest that the right of self-
defense may only be invoked in the event of an 'armed attack'. On this analysis, the 
                                                        
25 Feldman, "The Bombing of Osiraq Revisited," 125 quoted in Ford (2004) “ Israel’s Attack On Osiraq: A Modern For Future 
Preventive Strikes?” 
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Israeli operation would be unlawful as it was not preceded by an armed attack on Iraq” 
(Pogany, 1981). Weise (2012) summed up the attack: 
Israel’s bombing of Osirak would be illegal under the proposed standard. Though 
Iraq was illegally proliferating and Israel was specifically threatened by the Iraqi 
proliferation, Israel failed to bring the issue to the Security Council. Moreover, 
Israel is not in good standing with its international non-proliferation obligations 
(Weise, 2012). 
 
Subsequently, Israel attack was not consistent with Article 51 of the United Nations  
 
Charter. The attack was illegal under International Law 
 
Israel Interpretation of the Attack 
Begin released a statement to the public defending his state’s right of preemptive self-
defense after the attack. Indeed, Begin’s statement is mentioned in Spector and Cohen’s 
article Israel’s Airstrike on Syria’s Reactor: Implications for the Nonproliferation 
Regime:  
We chose this moment: now, not later, because later may be too late, perhaps 
forever. And if we stood by idly, two, three years, at the most four years, and 
Saddam Hussein would have produced his three, four, five bombs… Then, this 
country and this people would have been lost, after the Holocaust. Another 
Holocaust would have happened in the history of the Jewish people. Never again, 
never again! Tell so your friends, tell anyone you meet, we shall defend our 
people with all the means at our disposal. We shall not allow any enemy to 
develop weapons of mass destruction turned against us (Spector and Cohen, 2008) 
 
Then, in an interview within a CBS News television, Begin confirmed that this practice 
will be applied in future even with different governments. “This attack will be a 
precedent for every future government in Israel… [E]very future Israeli prime minister 
will act, in similar circumstances, in the same way”(Spector and Cohen, 2008).  
Begin’s Preemptive Self-Defense Doctrine:  
 
After Israel attacked Osirak reactor, scholars believed that Israel adopted preemptive self-
defense doctrine called “ The Begin Doctrine”. According to Brom (2005), Begin’s 
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Doctrine started before attacking Osirak and then it was generalized as an Israeli doctrine 
(Brom, 2005). Shai Feldman (op cit in Brom, 2005) analysis the change in Israel practice 
into “Begin Doctrine” however Feldman questions the effect of the doctrine on the long 
term (Brom, 2005): 
Shai Feldman, for example, describes how, in its June 9 announcement of 
Osiraq’s destruction, Israel’s government articulated its belief that, had Iraq’s 
President Saddam Hussein acquired nuclear bombs, he would not have hesitated 
to drop them on Israeli cities and population centers. The Israeli government then 
went on to a general preventive doctrine: “under no circumstances would we 
allow the enemy to develop weapons of mass destruction against our nation; we 
will defend Israel’s citizens, in time, with all the means at our disposal 26 .” 
Feldman adds that this theme soon was crowned as a “doctrine,” not only because 
it was immediately viewed as such by numerous observers worldwide, but also 
because Israel’s leaders have since repeated it on numerous occasions (Brom, 
2005).  
 
Begin’s Doctrine, in other words, advocates the usage of preemptive self-defense in the 
presence of an existential threat. “Israel would not tolerate its enemies’ acquisition of 
nuclear weapons, as an existential threat, it will take military action to destroy the threat 
if no other means are available which offer a high probability of success” (Brower, 2008). 
International Community Response After The Attack 
 
International Atomic Energy Agency Response: 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) condemned bombing Osirak. The 
IAEA considered Israel attack as an act of aggression against its trust climate and 
mechanisms. Iraq has been a party to the treaty on the NPT since 1970 and it accepted 
IAEA verification mechanisms (Bourdreau, 1993). “The IAEA concluded their 1981 
inspections of Iraqi facilities to be adequate” (Bourdreau, 1993). According to Pogany 
(1981), “The International Atomic Energy Agency, which inspected the Iraqi 
installations in January 1981, stated that it found no evidence that the reactor would be 
                                                        
26 Ha’aretz, Israel, June 9, 1981 quoted in Brom (2005) “Is The Begin Doctrine Still A Viable Option For  Israel? “ 
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used to produce nuclear weapons
27”(Pogany, 1981). Consequently, they demanded as 
the Security Council to end all assistance to Israel and to open its facilities to inspections 
within one year (Bourdreau, 1993).  
United Nations Response: 
 
The United Nations Security Council condemned Israel attack in Resolution 487. UNSC 
describes it as an act of aggression against the UN and the norms of International 
Conduct. One of the main points in the resolution called upon states to stop providing 
Israel with weapons (Resolution 487, 1981).  Also, the Security Council in the resolution 
requested to put Israel nuclear facilities under investigation (Resolution 487, 1981) and 
demanded Israel to pay compensation to Iraq (Resolution 487, 1981). However, “… 
reactions to Resolution 487 were mixed. Israel rejected the resolution as biased and 
argued that by removing the nuclear threat to its existence, Israel was exercising its right 
to self-defense” (Brower, 2008). Similarly, Iraq rejected it because Iraq requested 
imposing sanctions against Israel. “Iraq’s Foreign Minister said the motives behind 
Israel’s attack were to cover up its possession of nuclear weapons and to prevent Arab 
nations from acquiring scientific or technical knowledge”28(Brower, 2008).  
Iraq Response: 
 
To start, Saddam Hussein directed a speech after the attack to the international 
community. “He called on all peace-loving nations of the world to help the Arabs in one 
way or another acquire atomic weapons in order to offset Israel’s nuclear 
                                                        
27 Weekly Hansard H.C., Vol. 6, No. 116, col. 262. (9 June 1981). See, also, the statement of Mr Hurd, Minister of State at the Foreign 
& Commonwealth Office: * ... it is a pity that some Israelis continue to use the tragic memories of the holocaust as a justification for 
breaking international law.' ibid., Vol. 7, No. 127, col. 243. (24 June 1981) cited in Pogany (1981)” The Destruction of Osirak : A 
Legal Perspective” 
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capability”29(Brower, 2008). Following, Saddam accused France of assisting Israel in the 
attack (Brower, 2008). Saddam accused the Iraqi Atomic Energy administration of 
“failing to anticipate the strike”(Brower, 2008). After more than thirty years, Iraq still 
demands Israel compensate for destroying the reactor (Brower, 2008): 
 On 6 January 2010 an Iraqi parliamentary member explained, Prime Minister  
 Nouri al-Maliki is looking into plans that would compel Jerusalem to pay billions    
 of dollars in compensations for its 1981 attack on the Tammuz nuclear reactor.”30  
 (Arng, 2008) In fact, the United States confirms Iraq request and demanded the 
formation of a neutral committee to assess the damage (Brower, 2008). 
 
Arab Responses: 
  
The Arabs condemned the attack. “ A number of Arab states introduced a draft 
resolution to expel Israel from IAEA” (Feldman, 1982); in addition:   
Arab state and non-state actors including Kuwait, Jordan, the Palestine Liberation 
Organization, Syria, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, and Morocco 
denounced Israel’s attack on Iraq’s sovereign territorial... The league of Arab 
states denounced Israel attack and affirmed states right for peaceful usage of 
nuclear programs and it called on nations to stop supporting Israel
31
 (Brower, 
2008). Moreover, Egypt asked the American government to reconsider its military 
assistance to Israel (Brower, 2008). 
 
United States Reaction: 
 
The United States had different responses towards the attack. President Ronald Regan 
was pro-Israel. “When initially told of the attack by National Security Advisor Richard 
V. Allen, Reagan asked… Why do you suppose they did it?... Not waiting for a 
response, Reagan answered himself, Well, boys will be boys”(Brower, 2008). 
Nonetheless, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Secretary of State Haig had 
mixed feelings.  Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger describes the attack as a mere 
                                                        
29 Claire, 230.quoted in Brower (2008) “ Preemption and Precedent: The Significant of Iraq (1981) and Syria (2007) for an Israeli 
Response To An Iranian Nuclear Threat” 
30 Siasat.com, ―Iraq pursuing compensation for Israel nuke attack,‖  http://www.siasat.com/english/news/iraq-pursuing-
compensation-israel-nuke-attack (accessed 19 February 2011) cited in Brower (2008) “ Preemption and Precedent: The Significant of 
Iraq (1981) and Syria (2007) for an Israeli Response To An Iranian Nuclear Threat” 
31 UN, Department of Public Information, 276 quoted in Brower (2008) “ Preemption and Precedent: The Significant of Iraq (1981) 
and Syria (2007) for an Israeli Response To An Iranian Nuclear Threat 
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violation of US “Arms Export Control Act” (Brower, 2008). He demanded the United 
States to impose sanctions based on their violation of Arms Export Control Act (Brower, 
2008). As a result, “Secretary of State Haig announced that America was suspending the 
sale of F-16s to Israel, including four that were currently at General Dynamics awaiting 
delivery. However by September 1981, the sale of F-16s to Israel quietly resumed” 
(Brower, 2008).  
France Response: 
France condemned the attack on Osirak reactor. “French Foreign Minister Claude 
Cheysson argued that the strike was unacceptable, dangerous, and a serious violation of 
international law” (Brower, 2008). France in the United Nations claimed that the France-
Iraq deal was for scientific research and not for military uses
32
 (Brower, 2008). Also, 
France started leaking significant information on Dimona reactor which France assist 
Israel in building
33
 (Brower, 2008).  
Conclusion 
 Israel perceived Iraq’s nuclear reactor as a threat to its survival and against its position as 
a powerful nuclear weapon state in the region. In fact, the attack was not necessary 
because the threat was not imminent and Israel had other options than launching a 
preemptive attack: notifying the Security Council and International Atomic Energy 
Agency. Israel act was proportional to the threat because it attacked only the reactor. 
There was not any attack by Iraq against Israel. Therefore, the attack cannot be 
considered self-defense under Article 51 of United Nations based on the restrictive view. 
Subsequently, the presence of Iraq’s nuclear threat in 1981 led Israel to change its 
                                                        
32 UN, Department of Public Information, 277. Quoted in Brower (2008) “ Preemption and Precedent: The Significant of Iraq (1981) 
and Syria (2007) for an Israeli Response To An Iranian Nuclear Threat 
33 Claire, 227-228 quoted in Brower (2008) “ Preemption and Precedent: The Significant of Iraq (1981) and Syria (2007) for an 
Israeli Response To An Iranian Nuclear Threat 
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practice into a preemptive self-defense that is not consistent with Caroline case or 
with Article 51 of United Nations. In other words, Israel practice changed into 
preemptive self-defense in 1981 that is illegal under international law. The attack 
was based on “Begin Doctrine”; it allows Israel initiate preemptive self-defense 
strikes against Weapons of Mass Destruction in the region due to their grave effects; 
a main example that took place later is Syria 2007. Israel attack in 1981 was criticized 
by different states, United Nations, and IAEA because it breached International Law. 
This means Israel act in 1981 violates the second element that creates new norms: 
Opinio Juris.  
Case Study Four: Israel Bombing Al-Kibar Nuclear Reactor in Syria 2007 
 
The Attack: 
Spector and Cohen (2008) demonstrate Israel bombardment of Syrian reactor.  “ On 
September 6, 2007, in a surprise dawn attack, seven Israeli warplanes destroyed an 
industrial facility near al-Kibar, Syria, later identified by the CIA as a nearly completed 
nuclear reactor secretly under construction since 2001
34”(Spector and Cohen, 2008). In 
2006, Israel bombed Al-Kibar nuclear reactor in Syria. Makovsky (2012) in his article 
The Silent Strike describes the attack as “ it marked the rise of the Begin doctrine, named 
for Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, which held that no Israeli adversary in the 
Middle East should be allowed to acquire a nuclear weapon” (Makovsky, 2012). The 
main reason for bombing Al-Kibar was to stop North Korea, Iran, and Syria from 
cooperating “multinational nuclear weapons” (Spector and Cohen, 2008). There is not 
                                                        
34 “Background Briefing With Senior U.S. Officials on Syria’s Covert Nuclear Reactor and North Korea’s Involvement,” April 24, 
2008, available at dni.gov/interviews.htm; Ronen Bergman and Ronen Solomon, “Al-Asad’s Atom Program,” Ye’diot Achronot, April 
4, 2008. 
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much discussion on Israel reasons for the attack, but the most important part of bombing 
Al-Kibar is the aftermath of the attack. 
The Aftermath 
“The international silence continued even after the CIA on April 24, 2008, provided a 12-
minute video and an extensive briefing that made a strong case that the target was a North 
Korean-built reactor designed for producing weapons-usable plutonium” (Spector and 
Cohen, 2008). The international community did not condemn Israel attack against Al-
Kibar in Syria. 
The Arab world was largely silent following the IAF’s attack at al- Kibar. 
Because of the media blackout in Israel and speculative reports worldwide, Arab 
nations were unsure of exactly what had occurred. Moreover, the IDF had not 
invaded Syria with a large conventional force; instead they conducted a surgical 
strike which resulted in little collateral damage and no human loss. If the Arab 
world demanded punitive action from the UN or mounted a counteroffensive, then 
those nations might be seen as complicit in the building of the al-Kibar reactor. 
Lastly, many Arab states tacitly approved of the strike because a nuclear-equipped 
Syria would further destabilize the region” (Brower, 2008).  
 
Moreover, cooperation between US and Israel is reflected in the Syrian case. Olmert 
asked Bush to attack the reactor however US demanded to submit the issues to the IAEA. 
But then, Olmert requested US to remain silent about the attack and US respected that: 
Bush recalled, this was his operation and I felt an obligation to respect his wishes. 
I kept quiet, even though I thought we were missing an opportunity (to isolate 
Assad’s regime)35” (Brower, 2008). 
 
The United Nations reaction towards Israel in 2007 is not the same as in 1981. The attack 
was not discussed either in the Security Council or General Assembly (Brower, 2008). “ 
In fact, Israel uncovering and destroying Syria’s covert site at al-Kibar caused increased 
IAEA scrutiny of Syria’s nuclear program whose efforts continue to this day” (Brower, 
                                                        
35 Bush, 422 quoted in Arng (2008) “ Preemption and Precedent: The Significant of Iraq (1981) and Syria (2007) For an Israeli 
Response to the Iranian Nuclear Threat” 
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2008). The IAEA condemned the attack however without imposing sanctions on Israel. 
El Baradi demonstrates: 
It is deeply regrettable that information concerning this installation was not 
provided to the Agency in a timely manner and that force was resorted to 
unilaterally before the Agency was given an opportunity to establish the facts, in 
accordance with its responsibilities under the NPT and Syria’s Safeguards 
Agreement. He went on to stress, however, that Syria, like all States with 
comprehensive safeguards agreements, has an obligation to report the planning 
and construction of any nuclear facility to the Agency. We are therefore treating 
this information with the seriousness it deserves, noting that an IAEA inspection 
team would visit Syria June 22-24, 2008. Nonetheless, the IAEA’s official 
summary of the meeting does not indicate that the matter was further 
debated, a silence on the matter that at least one official present confirmed 
(Spector and Cohen, 2008). 
 
Begin’s Doctrine: 
Syria’s reactor was not an imminent threat. There were other options for Israel but it 
decided to bomb the reactor. In other words, it was not necessary for Israel to bomb Syria 
in 2007. Also, the attack breached article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Indeed, there 
are similarities between the conditions identified in Begin and Bush Doctrine and 
the attack. 
Israel’s strike on al-Kibar in September 2007 was, in effect, a clear application of 
this internationally disfavored doctrine. Given that the al-Kibar reactor had not 
started to operate and, according to the CIA, Syria’s fuel fabrication and 
reprocessing facilities had not been discovered and might not yet have been 
completed, Syria was unquestionably some time away from producing fissile 
material for nuclear weapons and still further from producing the weapons 
themselves (Spector and Cohen, 2008). 
 
However, there was not international condemnation against Israel bombardment of 
Osirak. 
 
Why No Condemnation? 
One view presented by Egyptian Ambassador Nabil Fahmy in 2008 in a forum that took 
place in Washington (op cit in Spector and Cohen, 2008) is: 
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Governments in the region had refrained from commenting because so little 
authoritative information was originally provided officially by the governments 
involved. He added that the episode had also been overshadowed by other events 
in the region and that governments would be more likely to speak to the issue 
once the IAEA had completed its initial investigation of the incident. Yet, the 
reasons behind the international silence appear to be considerably more complex 
and could indicate a broader concern about the underlying weakness of the NPT 
regime (Fahmy op cit in Spector and Cohen, 2008). 
 
The second view is that political reasons encouraged Israel to attack Al-Kibbar and 
encouraged the silence of the international community. Syria was viewed as:  
An isolated state with close ties to Iran, Syria is perceived as a disruptive 
influence in the region, even within the Arab community, making it a decidedly 
less sympathetic victim of Israeli pre-emption than Iraq in 1981. Also, the specific 
details of the al-Kibar case itself, coupled with the as yet ineffective efforts to 
enforce the NPT in the case of Iran, have undoubtedly influenced thinking in 
foreign capitals (Spector and Cohen, 2008). 
 
Finally, it is believed that Security Council failed regarding Iran ending its uranium 
program (Spector and Cohen, 2008). In fact, the team that the IAEA sent to investigate 
the reactor concluded that it was not clear whether the reactor was for nuclear or peaceful 
means (Spector and Cohen, 2008). 
In Conclusion 
Israel attack against Al-Kibar was not consistent with Caroline Case requirements 
because the attack was not necessary and it violated Article 51 of the United Nations 
requirements for self-defense. There are similarities between the conditions 
identified in Begin and Bush Doctrine and the attack. Therefore, it breached the 
international law. The most important part is that the international community was 
silent in contrast to Israel attack against Osirak 1981 and US invasion in Iraq 2003. 
In other words, providing little information by the governments, the need for 
isolating Syria’s regime and the ineffective efforts to enforce the NPT encouraged 
international community silence after the attack. 
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Table 1: The Perceived Threat, The Breached Limits and International Community 
Reaction  
The Case Studies The Perceived Threat The Breached Limits 
(Caroline Case and Article 51 
of UN Charter) 
International 
Community 
Reaction 
The Possibility 
of An Attack By 
China Against 
North Korea 
The possibility of 
supplying non-state 
actors with nuclear 
weapons for financial 
gain and the possibility 
of refuge flows if North 
Korea nuclear weapons 
caused a conflict in the 
region or a major war 
There is not an armed attack 
yet. China prefers to decrease 
economic sanctions and 
increase economic aid; 
therefore, Article 51 is still in 
force. 
China influences North Korea 
through economic pressure 
therefore preemptive self-
defense attack is not 
necessary. In other words, 
China will not attack North 
Korea based on Caroline Case 
requirements.  
China respects Article 51 of 
UN Charter; however, North 
Korea left the NPT and 
disregards Security Council. 
 
US Invasion of 
Iraq 2003 
Dictatorship that has 
weapons of mass 
destruction and assists 
terrorist groups 
Breached Caroline Case 
Requirements (imminence of 
the threat, necessity and 
proportionality of the attack). 
Breached Article 51 of UN 
Charter requirement for self-
defense attack (no attack took 
place). 
Disregarded Security Council 
and IAEA Decisions. 
The Attack is based on Bush 
Doctrine 
General 
Condemnation 
Israel Bombing 
of the Iraqi 
Reactor “Osirak” 
1981 
Development of nuclear 
weapons which 
threatens its security, 
survival and position in 
the Middle East 
Breached the imminence 
element under Caroline 
requirements and Israel.  
Breached Article 51 of UN 
Charter requirement for self-
defense attack (no attack took 
place). 
Disregarded Security Council 
and IAEA. 
The attack is based on Begin’s 
Doctrine 
Condemnation 
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Israel Bombing 
of the Syrian 
Reactor “Al-
Kibar” 2007 
Development of nuclear 
weapons which 
threatens its security, 
survival and position in 
the Middle East 
No much Discussion on this 
attack.  
Same as Israel Bombing Osirak 
in 1981. It disregarded both 
Security Council and IAEA. 
There are similarities between 
the conditions identified in 
Begin and Bush Doctrine and 
the attack. 
 
Providing little 
information by 
the 
governments, 
the need for 
isolating 
Syria’s regime 
and the 
ineffective 
efforts to 
enforce the 
NPT 
encouraged 
international 
community 
silence after 
the attack. 
Given the 
international 
condemnation, 
 There is no 
opinio juris. 
Therefore, no 
new norm of 
preemption 
consistent 
with Caroline 
Principles 
coexists. 
 
 
Table 2: Similarities and Differences Between the Four Cases 
Similarities Between The Cases 
 US and Israel before initiating the three 
attacks assumed that the nuclear threat is 
imminent, overwhelming, leaving no other 
choice and no moment of deliberation. In 
other words, they assumed that their 
attacks are based on Caroline case 
requirements. 
 After initiating the three attacks, the project 
elaborates that the threat was not imminent 
and it was not necessary to initiate an 
attack. There was not an imminent threat, 
in other words. 
 In all the four cases there is not any armed 
Differences Between The Cases 
 Since China did not attack North Korea yet, 
it respects Security Council and IAEA 
decisions. Then, Article 51 in this case is 
respected in contrast to the other three 
cases. 
 China decreases economic sanctions and 
increases economic aids in the North Korea 
case in contrast to Bush and Begin Doctrine 
that allows preemptive attacks.  
 The US invasion of Iraq is generally 
condemned because it violates both 
elements under Caroline case (necessity 
and proportionality) and Article 51 of UN 
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attack that took place before initiating the 
self-defense attack. In the second, third and 
forth case studies there are a violation of 
Article 51 of UN Charter. 
 US and Israel used Bush and Begin 
Doctrine that have the same goal “ not to 
wait to be attacked by their enemies 
especially in the presence of WMD” to 
initiate self-defense attacks. 
 US and Israel disregarded International 
Law through violating Security Council 
resolutions and IAEA decisions. 
 US, Israel and North Korea is in violation 
with International Law. 
 Iraq and Syria accepted the IAEA 
inspections however Israel and North 
Korea are not part of the IAEA.  
 The violation of NPT and IAEA is a 
common element in the four case studies 
 Proportionality as an element under 
Caroline Case is respected in the two 
Israeli attacks in 1981 and 2007. 
 Israel in the two case studies is condemned 
because it violated the necessity of the 
attack under Caroline principles and it is 
condemned for not respecting Article 51. 
 Israel and US in the three case studies 
diverged from the international law and 
customary law requirements of self-
defense. 
 
Charter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMONDATIONS 
 
Major Interpretations of the Case Studies: 
 
State practice in the presented case studies show a tendency in the presence of the nuclear 
weapons threat to exceed self-defense requirements which is not supported by 
international law and customary international law. Unfortunately, the Security Council 
and IAEA have been ineffective in the three case studies.  
In the North-Korean case, the Chinese government chose not to resort to preemptive self-
defense. China has other options given its influence over North Korea; namely, reducing 
economic sanctions and increasing economic sanctions. China decided to abide by 
international law requirements of self-defense. It is important to mention that the IAEA 
and SC consider North Korea in noncompliance since 1993, but no military action is 
taken against North Korea until now. 
The 2003 US invasion of Iraq exceeded the limits of preemptive self-defense under 
Caroline case and Article 51 of UN Charter. The attack is based on Bush Doctrine that 
states “…the US was not going to wait for its enemies to attack first…” (Hamauswa and 
Manyeruke, 2013). US perceived Iraq’s threats as imminent (instant), overwhelming, left 
no moment of deliberation and no other choice. The threats are Saddam Hussein, Iraq 
linkage with Terrorists and Weapons of Mass destruction. The aftermath of the attack 
explains that the threats claimed by the United States were not: instant, overwhelming, 
leaves no moment of deliberation and leaving no other choice. United States had other 
options than invading Iraq: more inspections and sanctions. The invasion was not 
proportional to the threats stated by the US. As a consequence, United States invasion is 
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not consistent with Caroline requirements for preemptive self-defense. Although the 
United Nations passed seventeen resolutions condemning Iraq’s Weapons of Mass 
destruction program one of which is Resolution 1441, it did not authorize any attack 
against Iraq. Nonetheless, United States attacked Iraq without the approving of the 
Security Council. Iraq did not attack the United states therefore United States invasion in 
Iraq is not consistent with Article 51 of UN Charter requirement for self-defense. 
Subsequently, United States invasion of Iraq 2003 is not consistent with Caroline case 
principles for preemptive self-defense and not consistent with Article 51 of United 
Nations requirement for self-defense. 
The Israeli bombing of Osirak in 1981 was justified as based on Begin’s Doctrine. 
However, preemptive self-defense under Caroline case requires the threat to be imminent, 
overwhelming, leaving no choice and no moment of deliberation. In this case, Israel 
attack did not meet the requirement of necessity in preemptive self-defense under 
Caroline case. According to Israel, it has the capability to jeopardize Israel’s survival and 
monopoly of nuclear weapons in the region. Iraq’s threat in 1981 left no moment of 
deliberation given the timing of the bomb. The aftermath of the attack explains that the 
threat was not imminent and Israel did not consume all means before the initiating the 
attack. Israel did not bring the issue to the Security Council or the International Atomic 
Energy Agency. However, the attack was proportional. Israel interpreted the attack as an 
act of preemption under “Begin’s Doctrine”. Furthermore, the international community 
condemned the attack: the United Nations passed Resolution 487, International Atomic 
Energy Agency condemned the attack, Iraq, Arab countries and the United States 
condemned Israel bombing Osirak 1981. Caroline Doctrine allows preemptive self-
 83 
defense when the threat is instant, overwhelming, no moment of deliberation and leaves 
no other choice. However, Israel attack did not meet Caroline principles. As a result, 
Israel attack against Iraq in 1981 is not a preemptive self-defense act under Caroline 
Doctrine. In fact, Iraq did not attack Israel to allow an act of self-defense under Article 51 
of United Nations Charter. Consequently, the attack breached International Law 
requirement for self-defense: Article 51. Subsequently, Israel attack against Iraq’s reactor 
“Osirak” is not consistent with Caroline case principles for preemptive self-defense and 
not consistent with Article 51 of United Nations requirement for self-defense. The attack 
is based on “Begin’s Doctrine” that states in the presence of a nuclear weapons threat in 
the region, Israel will act preemptively. The international community condemned Israel 
act in 1981.  
The conclusion does not support my hypothesis. After analyzing the case studies, it is 
clear that in the presence of a nuclear threat, United States and Israel change their 
practice into preemptive self-defense that is illegal under international Law. US and 
Israel preemptive self-defense practice, in other words, are not consistent with Caroline 
principles or with Article 51 of United Nations. US and Israel preemptive self-defense 
attacks are based on the assumption that they will act preemptively in the presence of a 
nuclear threat regardless of the international law or international community 
condemnations. In other words, not all states are allowed to use preemptive self-defense 
under “ Bush Doctrine”; only states that United States trust are allowed to initiate 
preemptive self-defense under “Bush Doctrine” even if, the international community 
refuses these attacks mainly Israel. In the possibility of an attack by China against North 
Korea case, it is highlighted that China will not initiate a preemptive self-defense attack 
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against North Korea. China and North Korea are considered allies. Furthermore, China 
has leverage on North Korea; namely, economic aid and economic sanctions. Therefore, 
China will not attack preemptively North Korea even when the IAEA and SC maintain 
that North Korea is in non-compliance. Indeed, there is no new norm that allows 
preemptive self-defense under Caroline case in the presence of a nuclear weapons threat. 
State practice and Opinio Juris are the main factors that create new norms. However, in 
the case studies international community condemned the attacks: Israel attack 1981 and 
US invasion of Iraq 2003; as a result, the case studies lack the Opinio Juris element and 
general practice. 
Indeed, self-defense consists of the necessity of the attack, proportionality and 
conditionality of an armed attack under international law. In other words, states are 
allowed to defend themselves as long as the discussed elements existed. These elements 
distinguish self-defense from other types of use of force.  
Recommendations: 
 United States and Israel are members of the United Nations therefore they have a 
legal obligation to discuss their security issues there first before any military action.   
 Major penalties that include economic sanctions should take place in case of any 
breach of international law. 
 United States should start an initiative of disarmament to prevent preemptive self-
defense attacks. 
 The rules and laws of international law should be reconsidered to adapt to the nuclear 
threat. “To remain relevant, international law must adapt to the times and 
circumstances in which it is involved. Thus in the current era, where the combination 
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of WMD and terrorism pose a threat barely conceived of during the post-World War 
II formulation of the UN Charter, international law is in the process of undergoing a 
paradigm shift...”  (Sifris, 2003). For instance, the imminence of the nuclear threat 
should be revisited. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 86 
REFRENCES 
 
Aboul-Enein, S. (2010). Dr. Sameh Aboul-Enein Minister Plenipotentiary and Deputy  
Head of Mission of Egypt to the UK. Speech,Centre for Energy and Security 
Studies2010MoscowNonproliferationConference. 
http://cenessrussia.org/data/page/p310_1.pdf 
Arend, A. (2003). International Law and the Preemptive Use of Military Force. 1st ed.        
[ebook]The Washington Quarterly, p.102. Available at: 
http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/.../03spring_arend.pdf 
Armscontrol.org,. (2012). The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) at a Glance | Arms  
Control Association. Retrieved 4 March 2015, from 
http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nptfact  
Akande, D., & Lieflander, T. (2013). Clarifying Necessity, Imminence and  
Proportionality In The Law Of Self-Defense.The American Journal of 
International Law,107(3), 563-570. Retrieved March 3, 2014, from 
http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.5305/amerjintelaw.107.3.0563?uid=3737928&ui
d=2&uid=4&sid=21105524435311 
Atomicarchive.com, (n.d.). Effects of Nuclear Weapons | Science | atomicarchive.com.  
[online] Available at: http://www.atomicarchive.com/Effects  [Accessed 13 Dec. 
2014]. 
Asadov, N. (2012). The Efficacy of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime (Master of  
Arts). Eastern Mediterranean University. 
http://irep.emu.edu.tr:8080/jspui/bitstream/11129/293/1/Asadov.pdf 
 
Bassil, Y. (2012). The 2003 Iraq War: Operations, Causes, and Consequences. Journal Of  
Humanities And Social Science (JHSS), 4(5), 29-47. Retrieved from 
http://www.lacsc.org/papers/papera1.pdf 
Bresler, R., & Gray, R. (1977). The Bargaining Chip and SALT. Political Science  
Quarterly, 92(1), 65-88. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2148550 
Brower, T. (2008). PRE-EMPTION AND PRECEDENT: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF IRAQ  
(1981) AND SYRIA (2007) FOR AN ISRAELI RESPONSE TO AN IRANIAN 
NUCLEAR THREAT (MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE Strategy). 
Faculty of the US Army Command and General Staff College. 
file:///Users/macbookpro/Downloads/ADA547499%20(1).pdf 
Boudreau, D. (1993). The Bombing of The Osirak Reactor. International Journal On  
World Peace, 10(2), 21-37. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/20751886  
Brom, S. (2005). Chapter 6: Is the Begin Doctrine Still a Viable Option for Israel? In S.  
Brom, Getting Ready for a Nuclear-Ready Iran (1st ed., pp. 133-158). Strategic 
Studies Institute (SSI). 
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/DigitalLibrary/Publications/Detail/?lng=en&id=47904 
Beach, D., & Pedersen, R. (2011). What is Process-Tracing Actually Tracing? The Three  
Variants of Process Tracing Methods and Their Uses and Limitations. Annual 
Meeting. Retrieved from 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1902082 
Bush, G. (2003). President George W. Bush Speaks at AEI's Annual Dinner. AEI.  
 87 
Retrieved 19 March 2015, from http://www.aei.org/publication/president-george-
w-bush-speaks-at-aeis-annual-dinner/ 
BEKKER, P., & Bello,. (1997). INTERNATIONAL DECISION: LEGALITY OF THE  
USE BY A STATE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ARMED CONFLICT, 
Advisory Opinion. International Court of Justice, July 8, 1996. The American 
Society Of International Law American Journal Of International Law, 134. 
Retrieved from 
https://litigationessentials.lexisnexis.com/webcd/app?action=DocumentDisplay&
crawlid=1&doctype=cite&docid=91+A.J.I.L.+134&srctype=smi&srcid=3B15&k
ey=d078aedeed6d3c718f6bdcef9bc20c67  
 
Bunn, & Rhinelander,. The Right to Withdraw from the NPT: Article X is Not  
Unconditional | Acronym Institute. Acronym.org.uk. Retrieved 13 May 2015, 
from http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd79/79gbjr.htm 
 
Copson, R. (2003). Iraq War: Background and Issues Overview. Congressional Research  
Service. Retrieved from http://fas.org/man/crs/RL31715.pdf  
 
Cirincione, J., Mathews, J., Perkovich, G., & Orton, A. (2004). WMD in Iraq: Evidence  
and Implications (pp. 1-107). Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace. Retrieved from http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Iraq3FullText.pdf  
 
Crawford, Pellet, Olleson, & Parlett,. (2010). The Law of International Responsibility:  
James Crawford - Oxford University Press. Ukcatalogue.oup.com. Retrieved 13 
May 2015, from http://ukcatalogue.oup.com/product/9780199296972.do 
 
Early, B., & Asal, V. (2014). Nuclear Weapons and Existential Threats: Insights from a
 Comparative Analysis of Nuclear-Armed States (pp. 303-320). Routledge.  
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01495933.2014.941720#.VPbisLO
UczV  
Falleti, T. (n.d.)  Theory-Guided Process-Tracing in Comparative Politics: Something  
Old, Something New.. University of Pennsylvania. Retrieved 5 March 2015, from 
http://www.polisci.upenn.edu/~falleti/Falleti-CP-APSANewsletter06-TGPT.pdf 
Ford, C. (2007). DEBATING DISARMAMENT: Interpreting Article VI of the Treaty on  
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Nonproliferation Review, 14(3), 
401-428. doi:10.1080/10736700701611720 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10736700701611720?mobileUi=0#.
VPlnkbOUczV 
Ford, P. (2004). ISRAEL’S ATTACK ON OSIRAQ: A MODEL FOR FUTURE  
PREVENTIVE STRIKES? (MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES 
(DEFENSE DECISION-MAKING AND PLANNING). NAVAL 
POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL. http://fas.org/man/eprint/ford.pdf  
Fitzgerald, M. (2008). Seizing Weapons of Mass Destruction from Foreign-Flagged  
Ships on the High Seas Under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Virginia Journal of 
International Law Association, 49(2), 473-473. Retrieved March 4, 2015, from 
http://www.vjil.org/assets/pdfs/vol49/issue2/49_473-505.pdf  
Ferreira, A., Carvalho, C., Machry, F., & Rigon, P. (2013). Formation and Evidence of  
 88 
Customary International Law. Model United Nations Journal, 1, 182-201. 
Retrieved March 1, 2014, from http://www.ufrgs.br/ufrgsmun/2013/wp-
content/uploads/2013/10/Formation-and-Evidence-of-Customary-International-
Law.pdf  
Feldman, S. (1982). The Bombing of Osiraq—Revisited. International Security, 7(2),  
114-142. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538435 
Glaser, B., & Billingsley, B. (2012). Reordering Chinese Priorities on the Korean  
Peninsula (p. 68). Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies.  
Retrieved from  
http://csis.org/files/publication/121217_Glaser_ReOrderingChinese_web.pdf 
Greenwood, C. (2003). International Law and the Pre-emptive Use of Force:  
Afghanistan, Al-Qaida, and Iraq. San Diego International Law Journal, [online] 4,  
pp.7 - 543. Available at: http://tr6rt9pf7u.search.serialssolutions.com/ 
[Accessed,13 Dec. 2014]. 
Georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov,. (2002). President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat.  
Retrieved 19 March 2015, from http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021007-8.html 
Hamauswa, S., & Manyeruke, C. (2013). A Critique of United States’ Application of  
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter in Iraq and Afghanistan. International 
Review Of Social Sciences And Humanities, 4(2), 219-230. Retrieved from 
http://www.irssh.com/yahoo_site_admin/assets/docs/21_IRSSH-414 
V4N2.95130416.pdf 
Icrc.org. Customary IHL - Introduction. Retrieved 5 March 2015, from  
https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_in_asofcuin  
Icj-cij.org,. (1996). LEGALITY OF THE THREAT OR IJSE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS  
Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996. Retrieved 6 March 2015, from http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/95/7497.pdf 
Icj-cij.org,. (1969). International Court of Justice. Retrieved 13 May 2015, from  
http://www.icjcij.org/docket/index.php?sum=295&code=cs2&p1=3&p2=3&case
=52&k=cc&p3=5 
Icj-cij.org,. (1950). International Court of Justice. Retrieved 13 May 2015, from  
http://www.icjcij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&k=f8&case=7&code=cp3=4 
 
Ibp, U. (2005). Us Defence Policy Handbook (p. 14). Political Science. 
Iaea.org,. (2014). Fact Sheet on DPRK Nuclear Safeguards | International Atomic  
Energy Agency. Retrieved 8 April 2015, from 
https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/dprk/fact-sheet-on-dprk-nuclear-
safeguards 
International Crisis Group. (2005) (p. 29). Retrieved from  
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/north-east-asia/north   
korea/100_japan_and_north_korea_bones_of_contention.pdf 
 
Kammerhofer, J. (2004). Uncertainty in the Formal Sources of International Law:  
Customary International Law and Some of Its Problems. Retrieved 9 March 2015, 
from http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/15/3/360.pdf 
Katzman, K. (2003). Iraq: Weapons Threat, Compliance, Sanctions, and U.S. Policy.  
 89 
Congressional Research Service: The Library of Congress. Retrieved from 
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB80/wmd21.pdf 
Kim, D. (2013). Fact Sheet: North Korea's Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programs.  
Center for Arms Control. Retrieved 8 April 2015, from 
http://armscontrolcenter.org/publications/factsheets/fact_sheet_north_korea_nucle
ar_and_missile_programs/  
Kirschenbaum, J. (2010). Operation Opera: an Ambiguous Success. Journal Of Strategic  
Security, 3(4), 49-62. Retrieved from http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss  
LEGALITY OF THE THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS Advisory Opinion of 8  
July 1996. (1996) (1st ed.).  
Retrieved from http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/95/7497.pdf  
Mulcahy, J., & Mahony, C. (2006). Anticipatory Self-Defense: A Discussion of  
International Law. Hanse law review, 2(2), 231-248. Retrieved from 
http://www.hanselawreview.org/pdf4/Vol2No2Art06.pdf  
MARSHALL, E. (1980). Iraqi Nuclear Program Halted by Bombing. Science, 210(4469),  
507-508. doi:10.1126/science.210.4469.507 
http://www.sciencemag.org/content/210/4469/507.citation  
Makovsky, D. (2012). The Silent Strike - The New Yorker. The New Yorker. Retrieved 25  
April 2015, from http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/09/17/the-silent-
strike 
NTI: Nuclear Threat Initiative,. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons  
(NPT) | NTI. Retrieved 5 March 2015, from http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-
regimes/treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons/ 
Odomovo, A. (2013). New Security Threats, Unilateral Use of Force, and the  
International Legal Order. Military And Strategic Affairs, 5(3), 111-125. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.inss.org.il/uploadImages/systemFiles/New%20Security%20Threats,%
20Unilateral%20Use%20of%20Force,%20and%20the%20International%20Legal
%20Order.pdf  
Power, P. (1986). The Baghdad Raid: Retrospect and Prospect. Third World Quarterly,  
8(3), 845-868. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/3991926  
Pogany, I. (1981). The Destruction of Osirak: A Legal Perspective. The World Today,  
37(11), The World Today. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/40395239  
Presidentialrhetoric.com. (2002). George W. Bush, State of the Union Address—January  
29, 2002. Retrieved 19 March 2015, from 
http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/01.29.02.html 
Plant, T., & Rhode, B. (2013). China, North Korea and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons.  
Survival: Global Politics And Strategy, 55(2), 61-80. 
doi:10.1080/00396338.2013.784467 
http://tr6rt9pf7u.search.serialssolutions.com/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-
2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc% 
Record, J. (2003). The Bush Doctrine and War with Iraq. Strategic Studies Institute.  
Retrieved 19 March 2015, from 
http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/03spring/record.
pdf 
Remler, T. (n.d.). The Right of Anticipatory Self – Defense and the Use of Force in  
 90 
Public International Law.  LL.M. – Thesis. University of Cape Town. 
 http://www.publiclaw.uct.ac.za/usr/public_law/LLMPapers/remler.pdf 
Roberts, L. (2004). Mortality Before and After The Invasion of Iraq in 2003 (p. 7). Center  
for International Emergency Disaster and Refugee Studies, Johns Hopkins 
Bloomberg School of Public Health, Baltimore, MD, USA. Retrieved from  
http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~chazelle/politics/bib/lancet.pdf 
Scharf. (2014). Accelerated Formation of Customary International Law. 2
nd
 ed. Faculty  
Publications. Paper 1167.  
http://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2166&context
=faculty_publications  
Sifris, R. (2003). OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM: UNITED STATES V IRAQ — THE  
LEGALITY OF THE WAR. Melbourne Journal Of International Law, 4. 
Retrieved from 
  http://www.law.unimelb.edu.au/files/dmfile/download1a7d1.pdf 
Spector, L., & Cohen, A. (2008). Israel’s Airstrike on Syria’s Reactor: Implications for  
the Nonproliferation Regime | Arms Control Association. Armscontrol.org. 
Retrieved 19 March 2015, from http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_07-
08/SpectorCohen 
Ssa.gov,. (2002). George W. Bush Statements on Social Security - 2002. Retrieved 25  
April 2015, from http://www.ssa.gov/history/gwbushstmts2.html 
Smith,. Reconstituting Korean Security: A Policy Primer - United Nations University.  
Unu.edu. Retrieved 13 May 2015, from 
http://unu.edu/publications/books/reconstituting-korean-security-a-policy-
primer.html#overview 
 
The Osirak Attack: Israeli Statement of 8 June. Retrieved 8 March 2015, from  
http://iilj.org/courses/documents/TheOsirakAttack.pdf 
The Guardian,. (2003). Full text: Bush's speech. Retrieved 14 March 2015, from  
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/mar/18/usa.iraq  
Tsagourias, N. (22). Chapter 2 Necessity and the Use of Force: A Special Regime.  
In Necessity Actions International Law (Vol. 41, pp. 11- 44). Springer. 
Tiezzi, S. (2014). China Responds to North Korea's Nuclear Threat. Retrieved April 8,  
2015. http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/china-responds-to-north-koreas-nuclear-
threat/ 
Un.org,. (1981). A/RES/36/27. Armed Israeli aggression against the Iraqi nuclear  
installations and its grave consequences for the established international system 
concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons and international peace and security. Retrieved 10 March 2015, from 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/36/a36r027.htm 
UN News Service Section,. (2004). UN News - Lessons of Iraq war underscore  
importance of UN Charter - Annan. Retrieved 19 March 2015, from 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=11953& 
Un.org. (2003). SECURITY COUNCIL HOLDS FIRST DEBATE ON IRAQ SINCE  
START OF MILITARY ACTION; SPEAKERS CALL FOR HALT TO 
AGGRESSION, IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL | Meetings Coverage and Press 
 91 
Releases. Retrieved 19 March 2015, from 
http://www.un.org/press/en/2003/sc7705.doc.htm 
Un.org,. Charter of the United Nations: Chapter VII: Action with Respect to Threats to  
the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Agression. Retrieved 25 April 2015, 
from http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml 
Un.org,. (1970). UNODA - Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Retrieved 25 
April 2015, from http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT.shtml 
Weise, R. (2012). How Nuclear Weapons Change The Doctrine Of Self-Defense (Master  
of Public Affairs). NYU School of Law.   
 http://nyujilp.org/wp content/uploads/2013/02/44.4-Weise.pdf   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX A 
 
          The Four Case Studies 
 
North Korea  
Problem 
How China Perceived  Would It Be Necessary To Attack?  IAEA and Security Council 
 Resolutions Regarding  
North Korea 
Exercised 3 
 nuclear  
tests since 2006-  
(Uncertainty ) 
It withdrew from 
 the NPT 2006 
The increase of  
Insecurity in the 
 region 
 
Selling the NW to  
non-state actors 
For financial gains & refuge flows in  
In case of war against 
 DPRK 
No. Allies& Other options:  
Decrease economic sanctions & 
Increase economic aid  
DPRK left the NPT &  
Disregarded SC  
Resolutions: 
1718, 1874 and 2087 
 
The Case Studies  How they Perceived The Threat?  
 
 92 
 Imminent Overwhelming  Leaving No Moment 
of Deliberation 
No Other 
 Choice 
US invasion in Iraq  
2003 
Yes                
Israel Bombing Osirak 
 1981 
Yes 
Israel Bombing Al-Kibar 
 2007 
Yes 
 
The Case Studies The Aftermath  
 Imminent Overwhelming Leaving No Moment 
of Deliberation 
No Other 
 Choice 
Proportional 
US invasion 
 in Iraq  
2003 
Not Necessary & Other choice:  
more inspections & more 
Sanctions 
No 
Israel Bombing 
 Osirak 
 1981 
Not Necessary & Other choice:  
notifying the SC and IAEA 
Yes 
Israel Bombing  
Al-Kibar 
 2007 
Not Necessary & Other choice:  
notifying the SC and IAEA 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Case Studies Consistent with Article 51? Attack Based on what? 
US invasion  
in Iraq  
2003 
No Bush Doctrine 
Israel Bombing 
 Osirak 
 1981 
No Begin Doctrine 
Israel Bombing 
 Al-Kibar 2007 
  
No Begin Doctrine 
The Case Studies IAEA/ NPT / SC International  
Community Respond  
US invasion in Iraq  
2003 
Disregarded Security 
Council and IAEA 
Decisions. Res. 1441 
 
General 
Condemnation 
 
Israel Bombing Osirak 
 1981 
 
Disregarded Security 
Council and IAEA 
Decisions. 
 
Condemnation 
 
Israel Bombing Al-Kibar 
 2007 
Did not notify IAEA/SC Did not Condemn 
 93 
 
